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CULTURALLY-BASED COPYRIGHT SYSTEMS?: 




No man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money.
1
  
I transmit but do not create.
2
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to Samuel Johnson). 
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ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE 
CIVILIZATION 9 (1995). 
 3. CONFUCIUS ET AL., THE ETHICS OF CONFUCIUS: THE SAYINGS OF THE MASTER AND HIS 
DISCIPLES UPON THE CONDUCT OF “THE SUPERIOR MAN” 90 (1915) (citation omitted). 
Washington University Open Scholarship











III. KOREAN COPYRIGHT AT THE NEW CENTURY: SOMETHING OLD, 
SOMETHING NEW, SOMETHING BORROWED, SOMETHING (FOR THE 
RED, WHITE, AND) BLUE ................................................................... 1132 
A. The Author’s Property Rights .................................................... 1133 
B. Cultural Norms .......................................................................... 1137 
1. Moral Rights and the Author’s Honor ............................... 1137 
2. Preference for Conciliation ............................................... 1140 
C. Education, Awareness, Enforcement? ....................................... 1143 
IV. TOWARD RESOLUTION AND COMPROMISE: U.S.-KOREA 
NEGOTIATIONS ................................................................................... 1145 
A. Lessons from the Cultural Divide (and Other Intangibles) ....... 1145 
1. What Consideration of Culture?: An Example .................. 1145 
2. U.S. Reaction. .................................................................... 1149 
3. Korean Reaction ................................................................ 1150 
4. U.S.-Korea Intellectual Property History .......................... 1154 
B. Incorporating Culture in Negotiations ...................................... 1156 
CONCLUSION  ............................................................................................ 1158 
 
INTRODUCTION 
If copyright generally is a “nearly deadly but intrinsically fascinating 
subject,”4 imagine copyright in an international setting, where the copyright 
laws of multiple nations are present.
5
 In such a setting, copyright systems of 
two nations representing societies different in race, ethnicity, language, 
history, and culture can be at issue. A further difference in legal systems—for 
example, a common law jurisdiction versus a civil law jurisdiction—could 
well leave an overall effect on an observer that is paralytic, entrancing, or 
both. Copyright disputes between the United States and Korea incorporate all 
of these differences.
6
 The subject is not merely of academic interest. In the 
already complex state of U.S.-Korea relations
7
 lurks the not insignificant 
 
 
 4. Peter Davison, Book Review, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2000, at 126 (reviewing 
EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT (2000)). 
 5. This would present a double challenge given Mark Twain’s note that “[o]nly one thing is 
impossible for God: to find any sense in any copyright law on the planet.” MARK TWAIN, MARK 
TWAIN’S NOTEBOOK 381 (1935). 
 6. Unless the context indicates otherwise, all references to “Korea” herein are to the Republic of 
Korea, also known as South Korea. 
 7. See generally DON OBERDORFER, THE TWO KOREAS: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY (1997); 
THE U.S.-SOUTH KOREAN ALLIANCE: TIME FOR A CHANGE (Doug Bandow & Ted Galen Carpenter 
eds., 1992). 
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matter of the continuing piracy in Korea of American intellectual property
8—
books, software, records, and movies.
9
 The damage to the United States has 
been extensive; the piracy has allegedly resulted in hundreds of millions of 
dollars in lost revenue for American copyright owners and a trade imbalance 
for the United States.
10
 Over the years, the situation has drawn sharp U.S. 




Commentators have offered various cultural explanations for the 
widespread piracy in Korea, among them that Koreans view intellectual 
creations as public goods that benefit society, rather than private property of 
the author.
12
 Often, however, commentators who refer to cultural differences 
do so conclusorily, or offer only brief, sometimes totemic, descriptions of the 
traditional Confucian values that shape the Korean concept of copyright,
13
 in 
contrast to the rights-based approach seen in the United States. An initial 
difficulty with such cultural references is that they are so general that they 
invite the obvious question: what culture (or what cultural differences)? 
Moreover, when commentators advance specific cultural traits to explain the 
Korean approach to copyright, those outside the jurisdiction see such traits as 
so foreign that they ignore them altogether,
14
 or quite the opposite, they 
overemphasize these traits, inviting a stereotyped view of Korean copyright. 
This Article offers a more complete elaboration of the cultural dimension of 
 
 
 8. Korea is one of several countries in Asia where there is piracy of American products. There 
are obvious parallels between Korea and China with respect to intellectual property, among them, the 
impact of Confucian influence on the reproduction of intellectual and artistic creations. Whereas the 
relationship between United States and China has long been adversarial, the U.S.-Korea relationship 
was for many years one of political, military, and diplomatic alliance, with occasional turbulence in 
recent years. This history may well impact negotiations between the United States and Korea over 
copyright protection. 
 9. For an early press account, see Richard Halloran, Seoul Is Moving on Book Pirates, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1974, at 15 (reporting American Embassy’s protest to Korean government about illegal 
copying by “book pirates”). 
 10. Between 1995 and 2000, Korean piracy allegedly cost the United States an average annual 
trade loss of over $390 million. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, 2001 
SPECIAL 301 REPORT: SOUTH KOREA 211 [hereinafter IIPA, 2001 SPECIAL 301 REPORT], available at 
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2001/2001SPEC301SOUTHKOREA.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2001). 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 17-23. 
 12. See, e.g., Kyung-Won Kim, A High Cost to Developing Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1986, 
§ 3, at 2. See also infra note 107. 
 13. See, e.g., Byoung Kook Min & James M. West, The Korean Regime for Licensing and 
Protection of Intellectual Property, 19 INT’L LAW. 545, 565 (1985) (“[D]o not underestimate the 
importance of language and cultural difference when consulting with Korean partners, government 
officials or patent attorneys.”); Elliott Hurwitz, Copyrights Are as Vital as Merchandise, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 1986, § 3, at 2 (stating, as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, that “the Administration has often met resistance from nations where protection of intellectual 
property may not be part of the prevailing culture”). 
 14. Ethnocentrism could contribute to this approach. See infra note 154. 
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copyright, principally for the Korean copyright system, but to some extent 
for the U.S. system as well.
15
 In so doing, this Article examines the cultural 
attitudes reflected in each jurisdiction’s copyright, and critiques and 
measures those cultural attitudes for practical and current applicability. This 
process ensures that the matter of culture in copyright receives the balanced 
attention that it is due.
16
 Awareness of the cultural aspects of each other’s 
copyright system will be important in future discussions between the United 
States and Korea, especially in light of the ongoing tension between the two 
over the piracy situation. 
Consider the history of the past seventeen years. The conflict began in 
1985 when the United States, complaining of rampant piracy of its 





 Diplomacy and negotiation helped to avert a 
potentially explosive situation the following year when the United States 
agreed to suspend the investigation in exchange for Korea’s pledge to enact 
new, comprehensive copyright legislation to protect foreign authors’ rights, 
aggressively enforce the new laws, and join international copyright 
conventions.
19
 That denouement would have made for a happy ending, but 
proved instead to be the beginning chapter in the protracted U.S.-Korea 
dispute over intellectual property rights. Since 1988 when the United States 
created a classification system to identify nations that do not provide 
 
 
 15. The examination herein takes into account the various layers of culture, appreciating its 
“thickness,” an oft-quoted concept advanced by anthropologist Clifford Geertz. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, 
Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 
(1973). 
 16. Commentators who attempt to reveal the intellectual property system of an Asian country 
often refer to the national culture and include some description of traditional attitudes that would 
explain the historical lack of appreciation for the concept of copyright there. E.g., Ruth L. Gana, 
Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPs Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 735, 
766-67 (1996) (discussing People’s Republic of China); Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and 
Perspectives: An Attempt To Use Shakespeare To Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property 
Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 16-21 (2001) (same). More informative are those works that elaborate on 
the impact of cultural attitudes on intellectual property policy in the contemporary setting. See 
generally ALFORD, supra note 2 (discussing Chinese culture and law); Toshiko Takenaka, Does a 
Cultural Barrier to Intellectual Property Trade Exist? The Japanese Example, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 153 (1996-97) (discussing Japanese culture and law). 
 17. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, currently, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-20 (1994), authorizes the 
President to take action in response to the policies or practices of foreign governments that meet 
certain criteria. See Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: 
Requirements, Procedures, and Developments, 7 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 633, 634 (1986). Section 301 
investigations “may be initiated in response to a petition filed by an interested party or by the [United 
States Trade Representative] on a self-initiated motion.” Id. at 645 (footnotes omitted). 
 18. See Anna Y. Park, Recent Development, International Trade-Agreement Between the United 
States and Republic of Korea Concerning Insurance Market Access and Intellectual Property 
Protection in the Republic of Korea, July 21, 1986, 28 HARV. INT’L L.J. 166, 166-67 (1987). 
 19. The agreement also covered the American insurance business in Korea. See id. at 167. 
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adequate protection of American intellectual property interests,
20
 the United 
States has placed Korea on the “Watch List” five times and on the more 
severe “Priority Watch List” eight times, including the last two years.21 This 
classification has done little to improve Korea’s image as an international 
pirate
22
 and a leading offender of unauthorized copying.
23
 In light of these 
setbacks, both sides must consider all possibilities to facilitate negotiations 
toward resolution, including a more thorough understanding of each side’s 
cultural traits that shape copyright policy.  
Part I of the Article introduces the concept of culture, acknowledges its 
many facets, and selects a definition of culture that emphasizes a group’s 
values-based, patterned way of thinking. This preferred definition provides 
the necessary foundation for a discussion of the relevant culture that shapes 
American and Korean approaches to copyright discussed in Part II. Part II 
 
 
 20. Two years after the U.S. agreement with Korea, Congress enacted the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, which included the so-called “Special 301” provision. The sole purpose 
of Special 301 was “to promote the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights in 
foreign countries.” Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, “Special 301”: Its Requirements, 
Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 259, 259 (1989). Special 301 directs the 
U.S. Trade Representative to identify annually those foreign countries that “deny adequate and 
effective protection of intellectual property rights,” 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A) (1994), or “deny fair 
and equitable market access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection,” 
id. § 2242(a)(1)(B). Special 301 also requires the U.S. Trade Representative  
to name as “priority foreign countries” those countries:  
(i) whose acts, practices, or policies are the most onerous or egregious, and have the greatest 
adverse economic impact on the United States; and (ii) that are not entering into good faith 
negotiations or making significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations to provide 
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights.  
Bello & Holmer, supra, at 261 (footnotes omitted). Rather than identifying countries as “priority 
foreign countries,” the U.S. Trade Representative created a “Priority Watch List” and “Watch List” 
classification system. Id. at 267. 
 21. Korea was placed on the “Priority Watch List” in 1989, the inaugural year of Special 301 
classifications; moved down to the “Watch List” in 1990 and 1991; returned to the “Priority Watch 
List” 1992 to 1996, inclusive; moved down again to the “Watch List” in 1997, 1998, and 1999; and 
returned again to the “Priority Watch List” in 2000 and 2001. See IIPA, 2001 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, 
supra note 10, app. E, at 62 (for 1989-2000); UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2001 SPECIAL 
301 REPORT 3, 13, available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/special.pdf. 
 22. For example, reports indicate that two out of three computer software products in use in 
Korea are pirated versions, sold far below cost and without any compensation to the owner of the 
copyright. See, e.g., Calvin Sims, How Korean Pride Rallied to Save a Software Maker, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 15, 1999, § 3, at 7; Korea’s Software Piracy Reached 70 Percent in 1996, NEWSBYTES NEWS 
NETWORK, May 9, 1997, available at 1997 WL 10172443. 
 23. Korea will likely remain a consumer of the works of foreign authors, especially in light of the 
national agenda seeking globalization, seh-ge-hwa. See Suh-Yong Chung, Is the Mediterranean 
Regional Cooperation Model Applicable to Northeast Asia?, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 363, 385 
(1999); Sang Don Lee, Essay, United States-Japan Trade Relations: A Comment from the Korean 
Perspective, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 127, 131 (1999). Even Korean products are subject to 
Korean piracy. For an example of rampant piracy of Korean software that nearly led to bankruptcy of 
the software company, see infra text accompanying notes 309-22. 
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summarizes the traditional American regard for private property, surveys the 
pertinent traditions from Confucian Korea, and explains how the respective 
traditional traits have shaped the contemporary understanding of copyright in 
each setting. This part focuses primarily on Korean cultural history, as it is 
more complex. It raises the question of whether the Korean cultural 
explanation for what Americans call “piracy” is over-emphasized or 
outdated. It is advanced here that while some traditional attitudes based on 
cultural values have a residual presence in contemporary Korea, they are, 
with respect to the current piracy situation, of mostly historical interest. 
Rather, more attention must be given to other cultural traits, like the 
Confucian-driven regard for status and for economic wealth as a means to 
attain it. 
Parts III and IV reveal that traditional cultural and societal attitudes 
permeate Korea’s copyright system. In addition, Parts III and IV argue that 
understanding the cultural dimension is crucial in international negotiations. 
To gain a more complete understanding of Korean copyright, Part III 
describes the current Korean copyright (i) law, which appears to be an 
amalgam of both the property-rights based approach seen in American 
copyright and selected traditional Korean cultural norms, and (ii) policy, 
which appears to reflect the priorities of a national copyright system in 
transition, from that of a traditional society with little need for formal 
copyrights to a member of the international marketplace. Part IV summarizes 
the important lessons U.S. and Korean representatives may take from the 
cultural discussion. Initially, international negotiators must consider culture. 
The still growing anti-American sentiment in Korea and America’s own 
checkered history in honoring the rights of foreign authors are also relevant. 
Indeed, cultural differences could explain why such sentiment and history are 
of more import to one side (Korea) than the other. Finally, in light of the 
cultural aspects of each jurisdiction’s approach to copyright, this Article 
offers preliminary thoughts to assist both sides in negotiations toward 
resolution. Ultimately, the matter of the protection of American intellectual 
property rights in Korea presents an enormously difficult situation. In a 
process that will require time, the parties can ill afford to refuse to be better 
informed. 
I. CULTURE AND THE COPYRIGHT 
The notion that a nation’s copyright laws are based in part on its culture24 
 
 
 24. See Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a “Bundle” of National Copyright 
Laws to a Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 265, 267 (2000); Barbara A. Ringer, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/3











appears to have become a maxim in international commentary.
25
 But what is 
culture?
26
 Culture is “a fundamental feature of human consciousness, the sine 
qua non of being human”;27 culture is our “social legacy”;28 culture may take 
over the world.
29
 Culture has also been described as “one of the two or three 
most complicated words in the English language.”30 There is no shortage of 
proposed definitions





 The various definitions exist in part 
 
 
The Role of the United States in International Copyright—Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 
1050, 1050 (1968). 
 25. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in 
the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 741 (2001) (citing Ginsburg, supra note 24); 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 471 (2000) (“[C]opyright law is an essential instrument of national cultural 
and information policy.”) (citing Ginsburg, supra note 24; Ringer, supra note 24). See also J.H. 
Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist’s Approach to a Technological Age, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 943, 948 (1991) (reviewing PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 
(1989)) (“Professor Goldstein pragmatically acknowledges the diverse cultural values that all 
developed copyright systems seek to implement.”) (footnote omitted). 
 26. And what does it mean to refer to an “American copyright culture”? Marci A. Hamilton, 
Appropriation Art and the Imminent Decline in Authorial Control over Copyrighted Works, 42 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 93, 102 (1994). Or to say that “[a]n ‘intellectual property culture’ has yet to 
be developed in Korea”? R. Michael Gadbaw, Republic of Korea, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 272, 275 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. 
Richards eds., 1988). 
 27. Kevin Avruch & Peter W. Black, Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Problems and 
Prospects, in THE CONFLICT AND CULTURE READER 7 (Pat K. Chew ed., 2001). Professor Chew’s text 
is recommended for a one-volume collection of insightful pieces on the impact of culture on conflict. 
See Cindy Fazzi, Book Review, Viewing Conflict Through the Lens of Culture, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 85 
(2001) (reviewing THE CONFLICT AND CULTURE READER, supra). 
 28. CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, MIRROR FOR MAN 26 (1949). 
 29. In a provocative and controversial piece, Professor Samuel P. Huntington declared that 
culture is the key factor in determining the balance of power in world politics: “The great divisions 
among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.” Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1993, at 22. Acknowledging the interrelation 
between culture and civilization, Huntington urged that the “principal conflicts of global politics will 
occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.” Id. His thesis drew sharp responses. See 
Responses to Samuel P. Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?”, 72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 
1993, at 2. 
 30. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 76 (1976). 
See John David Donaldson, “Television Without Frontiers”: The Continuing Tension Between Liberal 
Free Trade and European Cultural Integrity, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 90, 147 (1996) (“Without doubt, 
culture is one of the most difficult and problematic English terms to define due to its amorphous and 
inherently subjective nature.”) (footnote omitted). 
 31. Anthropologist Edward B. Tylor proposed one of the earliest definitions of culture: “Culture 
. . . is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” EDWARD B. TYLOR, PRIMITIVE 
CULTURE 1 (3d ed. 1889). 
 32. See IRWIN ALTMAN & MARTIN CHEMERS, CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT 3 (1980) (citing 
A.L. KROEBER & CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND 
DEFINITIONS 181 (1952)). 
 33. Or does it need a definition at all? Is culture like, for example, “‘time,’ ‘number,’ ‘beauty,’ 
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because the term is used by experts in a number of different social fields.
35
 A 
substantial bibliography now exists on the search for a definition of culture
36
 
(and perhaps a separate but related bibliography of works commenting on 
such search).
37
 Even accepting the pitfalls of adopting a single definition, this 
Article must do so in order to give meaning to the statement that “a nation’s 
copyright laws lie at the roots of its culture”38 and to determine the extent to 
which U.S. and Korean copyright systems are culturally-based.  
Thus, for purposes of this Article, bearing in mind that culture is not 
monolithic in any society
39
 and changes over time,
40
 references to culture 
include three components: (1) a patterned way of thought or behavior of (2) a 
group (3) that is based on certain values.
41
 The social, economic, political, 
 
 
and ‘law,’” all words “we use with perfect clarity . . . that we can’t define.” Publications Int’l, Ltd. v. 
Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.). I resist the temptation to liken culture 
to obscenity, to wit, that one knows it when one sees it. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). The literature indicates that culture is far more elusive than that, 
especially in the international setting. One may be in the presence of culture and not know it; one may 
expect culture and find something else. Culture is “the hidden dimension.” RAYMOND COHEN, 
NEGOTIATING ACROSS CULTURES 153 (1991). 
 34. See Robert H. Winthrop, Introduction: Culture and the Anthropological Tradition, in 
CULTURE AND THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT F. SPENCER 1 
(Robert H. Winthrop ed., 1990). 
 35. See Sally Engle Merry, Law, Culture, and Cultural Appropriation, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
575, 602 (1998). Anthropologists agonize over the meaning of “culture”; legal commentators presume 
to understand its meaning and use the term more freely. Legal scholars use the terms “law firm 
culture” and “corporate culture,” for example, without explanation. 
 36. See, e.g, ALTMAN & CHEMERS, supra note 32; JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF 
CULTURE (1988); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); ROGER M. 
KEESING, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 1981); CLYDE 
KLUCKHOHN, CULTURE AND BEHAVIOR (Richard Kluckhohn ed., 1962); A.L. KROEBER, 
ANTHROPOLOGY: CULTURE PATTERNS AND PROCESS 1 (1948); A.L. KROEBER & CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, 
CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS (1952); WRITING CULTURE (James 
Clifford & George Marcus eds., 1986); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of 
Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1859 (1991); 
John Frohnmayer, Should the United States Have a Cultural Policy?, 38 VILL. L. REV. 195, 195-96 
(1993); Ramón N. Valle, Ethics, Ethnicity, and Dementia: A “Culture-Fair” Approach to Bioethical 
Advocacy in Dementing Illness, 35 GA. L. REV. 465, 482-83 (2001). 
 37. DICK HEBDIGE, SUBCULTURE: THE MEANING OF STYLE (1979); FRANK R. VIVELO, 
CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY HANDBOOK (1978); Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law and Economics, 
the Culture of Deinvidualization, the Paradox of Blackness, 70 IND. L.J. 709, 715-17 (1995); Marshall 
Durbin, Cognitive Anthropology, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (John J. 
Honigmann ed., 1973). 
 38. Ringer, supra note 24, at 1050. 
 39. See ALFORD, supra note 2, at 6. There is a risk of overgeneralization in identifying culture. 
“But, to avoid this problem of stereotyping, we cannot then swing to an opposite extreme and argue for 
no commonalities. On the contrary, there is a middle ground where we can respectably speak of central 
tendencies among groups of people, a modality tendency.” CARLEY H. DODD, DYNAMICS OF 
INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 40 (2d ed. 1987). 
 40. See Merry, supra note 35, at 602. 
 41. The first formal definition of culture that encompasses these components appears to be by 
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and legal histories of the United States and Korea indicate certain prioritized 
values in each society that have led to a patterned way of thought (and 
action) regarding the concept of copyright. These cultural differences provide 
an explanation for how the United States and Korea developed not only 
different attitudes, but also “different realities, different worlds”42 regarding 
the protection of copyrights. 
II. CULTURALLY-BASED COPYRIGHT SYSTEMS 
A. American Property, American Copyright 
The commentary that analyzes the cultural differences purportedly 
motivating the Korean approach to copyright makes little mention of the 
United States’ culturally-based copyright system. In reality, American 
copyright also is shaped by cultural norms. This section argues simply that (i) 
the right of property, revered since the beginnings of the American 
experience, is ingrained in American culture; and that (ii) although copyright 
law seeks to protect property in a different form than land or tangible goods, 
it is driven by the same traditional regard for property ownership. Although 
the latter view is not unanimously held, an American author who complains 
of unauthorized copying of her work in a foreign jurisdiction essentially 




Kroeber and Kluckhohn: 
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by 
symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments 
in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and 
selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on one hand, be 
considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action. 
KROEBER & KLUCKHOHN, supra note 36, at 181, quoted and adopted in Alan Watson, Legal Change: 
Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1152-53 (1983). The same definition 
appears in KLUCKHOHN, CULTURE AND BEHAVIOR, supra note 36, at 73. Geert Hofstede’s more 
concise definition captures the essential components. GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: 
INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK-RELATED VALUES 21 (abridged ed. 1984) (Culture is “the 
collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from 
another. . . . Culture, in this sense, includes systems of values; and values are among the building 
blocks of culture.”). See also DAVID M. FETTERMAN, ETHNOGRAPHY: STEP BY STEP 27 (1989) 
(Culture includes “a social group’s observable patterns of behavior, customs, . . . way of life,” “ideas,” 
values or beliefs, definition of reality, “attitudes,” and “habits.”); ROBERT F. MURPHY, CULTURAL AND 
SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 26 (3d ed. 1989) (“Culture is an integrated system of meanings, values, and 
standards of conduct by which the people of a society live . . . .”). 
 42. Kenneth L. Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1957, 1957 (1988). 
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1. The Sacred Right of Property  
The American regard for the right of private property—the right to own 
and economically exploit property to the exclusion of others—was seen in 
colonial America. When the American independence movement reached a 
crescendo in the eighteenth century, mention of the right of property 
accompanied it.
43
 On the eve of American independence, some patriots saw 
the right to own property as a primary, indispensable right. Virginian Arthur 
Lee
44
 boldly pronounced that “[t]he right of property is the guardian of every 
other right.”45 In an attempt to rally his troops, George Washington reminded 
them that they were fighting for both freedom and property: “The time is 
now near at hand which must probably determine whether Americans are to 
be freemen or slaves; whether they are to have any property they can call 
their own . . . .”46 
Concerned with the need to safeguard property rights and related 
economic interests,
47
 the Founding Fathers included property explicitly in the 
Bill of Rights.
48
 It was thus preserved for American democracy.
49
 Because an 
 
 
 43. The motto of various American colonial newspapers in the 1760s was: “The united voice of 
all His Majesty’s free and loyal subjects in America—liberty and property, and no stamps.” 
BARTLETT, supra note 1, at 778. 
 44. Lee was a member of the Virginia House of Delegates and the Continental Congress and a 
revolutionary patriot. See LOUIS W. POTTS, ARTHUR LEE: A VIRTUOUS REVOLUTIONARY 5-6 (1981). 
 45. ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE JUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT 
BRITAIN, IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH AMERICA 14 (4th ed. 1775), quoted in JAMES W. ELY, JR., 
THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (2d 
ed. 1998).  Lee related property rights and liberty: “[T]o deprive a people of [the right of property], is 
in fact to deprive them of their liberty.” LEE, supra, at 14. 
 46. George Washington, Address to the Continental Army Before the Battle of Long Island 
(Aug. 27, 1776), quoted in BARTLETT, supra note 1, at 336. 
 47. ELY, supra note 45, at 4. Commentary strongly supports the proposition that the Framers 
considered protection of the property right a top priority. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory 
Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis “Goes Too Far,” 49 AM. U. L. REV. 
181, 195 (1999) (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 302 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1937)); Loren A. Smith, Life, Liberty & Whose Property?: An Essay on Property Rights, 30 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1996) (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 84, 85 (Alexander Hamilton)). But see 
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 12 
(1990) (arguing that Framers held diverging views about importance of property right). Charles A. 
Beard has gone so far as to argue that the drafters crafted the Constitution to protect their own 
economic interests. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 324 (5th ed. 1986). For critiques of this view, see ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES 
BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF “AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION” (1956); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & RICHARD H. LEACH, IN QUEST OF FREEDOM: 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 74 (2d ed. 1981). 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law . . . .”). See also id. amend. XIV (stating “nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). 
 49. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, with KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE 
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American’s right to property is fundamental, the Constitution requires a 
certain “due process” when the state intrudes on it.50 In 1829, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed this point when Justice Story declared, 
[G]overnment can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of 
property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body, 
without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free government 
seem to require, that the rights of personal liberty and private property 
should be held sacred.
51
  
Indeed, for over two centuries, protection of the right of property has been a 
staple of American constitutional law.
52
  
The enduring American experience reflects both a desire for property 
ownership and the accompanying demand for the protection of that property. 
In 1850, less than a century into the Republic’s history, the American 
obsession with property caught the attention of Tocqueville, a famed U.S. 
observer. “In no other country in the world,” he noted, “is the love of 
property keener or more alert than in the United States, and nowhere else 
does the majority display less inclination toward doctrines which in any way 
threaten the way property is owned.”53 The obsession with property appears 
to have remained a constant throughout America’s three centuries. Historian 
James Ely notes that the “widely shared desire to acquire and enjoy property 
has long been one of the most distinctive features of American society.”54 
Property is the “most American of all institutions.”55 Today, many 
Americans view the right of property as sacred,
56
 representing a “core 
 
 
COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1848), reprinted in KARL MARX, CAPITAL THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 
AND OTHER WRITINGS 335 (Max Eastman ed., Samuel Moore trans., 1959) (“[T]he theory of the 
Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.”). 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 51. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829). In a similar tone, one commentator 
argues that in Lockean liberalism, the state exists to promote and protect the appropriation of private 
property. See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 995 (1990). 
 52. See ELY, supra note 45, at 3 (“Throughout much of American history, economic liberty was 
an essential component of constitutionalism.”); Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 393, 405-06 (1988) (“For most of American constitutional history, rights theories have been 
associated with protection of property against a more just distribution of wealth and privilege.”).  
 53. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 638-39 (J. Mayer ed., 13th ed. 1966), 
quoted in ELY, supra note 45, at 160. 
 54. ELY, supra note 45, at xi (emphasis added). 
 55. Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal 
Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 379 (1988). A previous edition of Black’s Law Dictionary 
had declared that property is the “highest right a man can have to anything.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1095 (5th ed. 1979). This phrasing has been deleted in a subsequent edition. See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (7th ed. 1999) [hereinafter BLACK’S 7th ed.]. 
 56. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, A Jurisprudential Approach to Common Law Legal 
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value.”57 As in Washington’s day, the property right is revered in the same 
category as liberty and freedom.
58
 Although the discussion of whether the 
right to property is indeed the most important American right will continue in 
academic circles,
59
 its deeply rooted societal value is undisputed.
60
 
In the American culture of property, virtually every right at law is 
seemingly either a property right or only a slight degree removed. The U.S. 
public, its legislators, the bench, and the bar have become accustomed to 
looking at rights through the property lens. Within the past two decades, for 
example, the Supreme Court has ruled that a governmental regulation that 
results in loss of all economic value of a parcel of land constitutes an 
impermissible taking of property under the Fifth Amendment.
61
 A state 
supreme court has declared that a medical license is “marital property” for 
purposes of equitable distribution upon divorce.
62
 Another state court held 
that the right to bear arms is a property right, thereby resolving, at least 
within one jurisdiction, the great debate over the meaning of the Second 
 
 
Analysis, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 269, 284 (1999); Raymond R. Coletta, The Measuring Stick of 
Regulatory Takings: A Biological and Cultural Analysis, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 20, 69 (1998); Paul 
Finkelman, Civil Liberties and Civil War: The Great Emancipator as Civil Libertarian, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 1353, 1368 (1993) (reviewing MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991)); Maya Grosz, To Have and To Hold: Property and State Regulation of 
Sexuality and Marriage, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 237 (1998). 
 57. Frank A. Vickory & Barry A. Diskin, Advances in Private Property Protection Rights: The 
States in the Vanguard, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 561, 595 (1997) (citing Jonathan H. Adler & Kellyanne 
Fitzpatrick, For the Environment, Against Overregulation, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1996, at A12). 
 58. See generally RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999). Machiavelli noted the 
relation between the right to property ownership and individual honor. “When neither their property 
nor their honor is touched, the majority of men live content.” BARTLETT, supra note 1, at 136 (quoting 
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 19 (W.K. Marriott trans., 1532)). 
 59. Could any right surpass the right of life? Professor Carol M. Rose examines the question of 
whether the right of property is truly the most important right and provides a survey of the key 
arguments supporting the proposition. Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 329 (1996). In the end, she finds the declaration exaggerated, preferring instead,  
a rather modest claim for property as a keystone right, that is, as an educative institution. On that 
conception, property would play a central role not as the fierce bulldog guardian of autonomous 
individual rights, but rather as the gentle and somewhat fragile persuader, rewarding the character 
traits needed not only for commerce but also for self-government. 
Id. at 364. 
 60. Indeed, one author goes so far as to state that the American reverence for property is not only 
a matter of American culture, but also a result of an American “biological predisposition.” Coletta, 
supra note 56, at 23, 24. 
 61. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). 
 62. See O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713 (N.Y. 1985). The court rejected arguments that 
such a license does not carry the characteristics of property. Id. at 715. The O’Brien decision appears 
to be the minority rule, although that minority may be growing. See Susan Etta Keller, The Rhetoric of 
Marriage, Achievement, and Power: An Analysis of Judicial Opinions Considering the Treatment of 
Professional Degrees As Marital Property, 21 VT. L. REV. 409, 425-26 (1996). Professor Keller also 
discusses the property interest asserted in other matters relating to the marriage setting—nonvested 
pension benefits, dead bodies, frozen embryos, and body parts. Id. at 441-44. 
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 Likewise, law commentators have seized on the tendency to 
portray issues in the property cloth. For example, critical race theorists, no 
friend of traditional academia, nevertheless command the attention of the 
latter when they ask whether one’s race is a form of property—that is, 
whether one can claim a property right in her “whiteness.”64 There 
apparently are no limits to the extent to which a matter can be characterized 
in proprietary terms in discourse by legal scholars, save their imagination.
65
 
2. Property Right in Copyright 
Is not copyright merely protection of a different form of property? In 
1855, writer and constitutional scholar Lysander Spooner made a passionate 
case for why results of intellectual labors should have the same legal status 
and protection as tangible property.
66
 A precocious thinker, Spooner first 
explained that property is a form of wealth, and wealth is any thing that is 
valuable to or contributes to the well-being of humankind.
67
 “All property is 
wealth,”68 he explained, and “[p]roperty is simply wealth[] that is 
possessed—that has an owner.”69 Emphasizing the exclusive ownership 
dimension of property, Spooner noted that property belongs to its proprietors 
“and not to another man. He has a right, as against all other men, to control it 
 
 
 63. See Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 694 (Ind. 1990) (interpreting provision of 
Indiana Constitution). 
 64. See Derrick Bell et al., Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of Liberation, 37 
UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1053-58 (1990). See also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 1709 (1993). 
 65. One author of the conventional camp has openly questioned whether scholars who endorse 
the narrative or storytelling form in legal scholarship claim it as a matter of proprietary interest: 
“Anyone who challenges this ownership . . . is treated as a trespasser.” Jim Chen, Panel on Narrative, 
National Association of Scholars (Jan. 8, 1998), quoted in Kathryn Abrams, How To Have a Culture 
War, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091, 1117 n.48 (1998) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, 
BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997)). 
 66. LYSANDER SPOONER, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: OR AN ESSAY ON THE RIGHT 
OF AUTHORS AND INVENTORS TO A PERPETUAL PROPERTY IN THEIR IDEAS (1855), reprinted in 3 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF LYSANDER SPOONER 9 (Charles Shively ed., 1971), discussed in Tom G. 
Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal 
Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 821-22 (1990). 
 67. SPOONER, supra note 66, at 10, 13. A great deal under the sun could classify as wealth, as it 
includes “every conceivable object, idea, and sensation, that can either contribute to, or constitute, the 
physical, intellectual, moral, or emotional well-being of man.” Id. at 10.  
Every thing, therefore—whether intellectual, moral, or material, however gross, or however 
subtile [sic]; whether tangible or intangible, perceptible or imperceptible, by our physical 
organs—of which the human mind can take cognizance, and which, either as a means, occasion, 
or end, can either contribute to, or of itself constitute, the well-being of man, is wealth. 
Id. at 13. 
 68. Id. at 15. “[B]ut all wealth is not property.” Id.  
 69. Id. 
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according to his own will and pleasure; and is not accountable to others for 
the manner in which he may use it.”70 Spooner also stated that “[e]very 
conceivable thing, whether intellectual, moral, or material,” that can be 
“possessed, held, used, controlled, and enjoyed, by one person” and not 
another “is rightfully a subject of property.”71 Thus, Spooner concluded, “A 
man’s rights . . . to the intellectual products of his labor, necessarily stand on 
the same basis with his rights to the material products of his labor.”72 
Spooner’s eloquence did not convince all. In the twentieth century, 
Professor Wendy Gordon returned to the question of property rights 
protection in copyright.
73
 In a probing study, she highlighted and updated the 
continuing objections to extending property protection to authors’ works 
(within the “long and honorable history” of the “[h]ostility to copyright”74), 
many of which were initially rejected by Spooner. Chiefly, some 
commentators balked that “certain objects of intellectual property law are not 
sufficiently ‘thinglike’ to be the subject of ‘ownership.’”75 Hence, Professor 
Gordon noted that in both lay opinion and in academia, “there seems to be a 
 
 
 70. Id. at 16 (emphasis omitted). See also id. at 16-17 (“This right of property, which each man 
has, to what is his own, is a right, not merely against any one single individual, but it is a right against 
all other individuals, singly and collectively . . . . It is a right against the whole world. The thing is his, 
and is not the world’s.”). 
 71. Id. at 17. 
 72. Id. at 27. Spooner continued, “If he have the right to the latter, on the ground of production, 
he has the same right to the former, for the same reason; since both kinds of wealth are alike the 
productions of his intellectual or spiritual powers.” Id. Spooner had also raised and answered a host of 
objections to extending property protection to intangible property. Id. at 31, 41-42, 57, 61, 73, 75-76, 
105, 108. 
 73. Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, 
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989). 
 74. Id. at 1344. As Professor Gordon has reported, the leading works against the property-for-
copyright movement are Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1972); 
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case of Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair 
Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988); Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-
Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261 (1989); Timothy P. Terrell & Jane 
S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the 
Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1 (1985). Gordon, supra note 73, at 1344-47. Consistent with this 
body of literature is the once held view that copyright, along with other subjects in intellectual 
property, was a subject of only “modest intellectual merit.” William P. Alford, How Theory Does—
and Does Not—Matter: American Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA 
PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 9 (1994). Copyright was once described as “an offshoot of patent law—as one of 
the two queer branches of our jurisprudence in which, by an exception depending on the statute, 
intangible ideas are protected.” Kenneth B. Umbreit, A Consideration of Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 
932, 932 (1939), quoted in Gordon, supra note 73, at 1347 n.16. 
 75. Gordon, supra note 73, at 1346. The thingness requirement is not beyond the pale. See 
BLACK’S 7th ed., supra note 55, at 1232 (defining “property” as “1. The right to possess, use, and 
enjoy a determinate thing . . . 2. Any external thing over which the rights of possession, use, and 
enjoyment are exercised . . . .”) (emphases added). 
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feeling that having intellectual property rights is less natural than having 
tangible property rights, and that somehow the compulsions inherent in 
copyright require special justification.”76 Professor Gordon then attempted to 
justify extending property protections to copyright, arguing that “copyright is 
functionally as well as structurally consistent with tangible property.”77 
Other commentators agree in result and see no need to agonize over the 
theoretical objections. Professor Howard Abrams, for example, 
acknowledges “the ruckus,” but reaches the “obvious” conclusion that 
“[c]opyrights are a form of property.”78 Professor Neil Netanel goes so far as 
to state that “U.S. copyright doctrine applies traditional property principles to 
the field of copyright, and treats authors’ works as the subject of proprietary, 
quasi-ownership rights.”79 Still, other commentators emphasize the utilitarian 
purpose that American copyright serves, that of granting exclusive rights to 
authors in order to encourage their work in the arts.
80
 A leading treatise offers 
 
 
 76. Gordon, supra note 73, at 1347. 
 77. Id. at 1378. She summarized her work thus:  
I suggest that intellectual property doctrine provides functional substitutes for the missing element 
of tangibility and argue that this functional understanding explains intellectual property law’s 
willingness to give rights over use. I also suggest that as a result, restraints on liberty need not be 
any more a part of intellectual property rights than they are of any property rights. Finally, I show 
the similarity in economic role played by the entitlement package in both forms of property. 
Id. 
 78. HOWARD B. ABRAMS, 1 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1.02[A], at 1-10 (1991). Rights in 
copyright “can be protected in the courts, can be transferred, and, if the work is popular, earn a good 
deal of money. The jurisprudential aphorism that if something looks like a duck, walks like a duck, 
and quacks like a duck, then it is a duck, holds true.” Id. For example, when Ted Turner announced 
plans to colorize black and white movies to which he had obtained rights, over the vehement 
objections of the directors who created the classics, he reportedly retorted, “The last time I checked, I 
owned those films,” William H. Honan, Artists, Newly Militant, Fight for Their Rights, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 1988, at C29 (emphasis added), and “I think the movies look better in color, pal, and they’re 
my movies.” PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX 166 (1994) (emphasis added). All of America knew what he meant: the movies were 
Turner’s property.  
Moreover, historian James Ely explained that “property is a dynamic concept” and that 
[f]orms of wealth change over the course of decades or centuries. In the eighteenth century, land 
was the principal form of wealth. By the late twentieth century land, though still important, had 
been eclipsed by intangible property such as stocks, bonds, and bank accounts. Many 
commentators, furthermore, believe that intellectual property, especially patents, will represent the 
most significant wealth of the next century. 
ELY, supra note 45, at 6 (emphasis added). 
 79. Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United 
States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 7 (1994). “American law has 
traditionally treated authors’ creations as objects of ownership.” Id. at 1. See also Roberta Rosenthal 
Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1985) [hereinafter Kwall, Copyright and Moral Right] (“[T]he primary objective of our copyright law 
is to ensure the copyright owner’s receipt of all financial rewards to which he is entitled, under the 
1976 [Copyright] Act, by virtue of ownership.”). 
 80. E.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Quest for Enabling Metaphors for Law and Lawyering in the 
Washington University Open Scholarship











the dual realities of American copyright: although “[t]he primary purpose of 
copyright . . . is not to reward the author, but . . . rather to secure ‘the general 
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors,’”81 the author’s 
reward of the exclusive rights to the copyrighted work is a “necessary 
condition to the full realization” of the creative activities of the authors from 
which the public benefits.
82
  
Whatever the arguments challenging the proprietary foundation in 
copyright,
83
 those American authors—more accurately, copyright holders 
(after all, an author may contractually give up her economic interest in her 
work)—who complain of piracy and unauthorized copying abroad are 
advancing the exclusive property right to which they have become 
accustomed to receiving intranationally.
84
 These copyright holders typically 
base their argument on the culturally ingrained American belief that one has 
the sacred right to exploit the economic benefits of one’s property.85 
Moreover, when the U.S. government objects to the piracy and the resulting 
“trade imbalance,” it does so on behalf of the nation’s collective economic 
(property) interests.
86
 Here, the highly valued property right is advanced not 
 
 
Information Age, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2029, 2041 (1996) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, 
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)); 
Alfred C. Yen. A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technology, Copyright 
Liability, and the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247, 253 n.24 (2001) 
(same). As the Supreme Court has explained: “The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of 
authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 81. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] at 1-66.17 
(2001) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
 82. Id. at 1-66.18.  
 83. It is not necessary to resolve the dispute over whether creative expressions of authors or 
artists should be given the same protection as traditional tangible property, like land. Case law includes 
language that supports both positions. Compare Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 
236 (1939) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (Copyright Act “create[s] a form of property in the literary or 
artistic production of the author or artist. The Act attaches to the product of his brain certain attributes 
of property.”), with Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 581 (D.D.C. 1981) 
(stating copyright protection is not “just the vindication of private property rights”). 
 84. Note the unambiguously property-oriented phrasing in the introduction of a practice guide to 
intellectual property protection in Asia: “This book describes how one can acquire title to intellectual 
property in the countries of Asia, and how to assure that competitors respect that title.” Arthur 
Wineburg, Protecting Intellectual Property—A Capital Asset, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION IN ASIA § 1.01, at 1-3 (Arthur Wineburg ed., 2d ed. 1999) (emphases added). 
 85. This still-disputed American property-oriented approach to intellectual property did not 
mature fully until the end of the twentieth century. During much of the nineteenth century, the United 
States was itself a notorious pirate of foreign authors’ works. See infra text accompanying notes 327-
34. 
 86. As Professor Alford pointed out, both the (Elder) Bush and Clinton administrations elevated 
the U.S. intellectual property protection to one of the central objectives of American foreign policy, 
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privately, but with the voice and legitimacy of a sovereign.  
When Americans seek intellectual property rights protection in other 
jurisdictions, Professor William P. Alford asks, “[A]re we not assuming that 
the definitions and attributes of property rights are uniform world-wide? Is 
that a wholly warranted assumption?”87 These questions join the issue of the 
culturally-based copyright systems. The next section addresses the cultural 
forces that have shaped Korea’s approach to copyright. 
B. Korea: Another Century of Confucian Tradition? 
Logically, Korea could have been one of the first organized societies in 
the world to recognize formally the proprietary interest in authors’ works. 
After all, historians credit Korea with producing the first movable metal type 
printing press in the thirteenth century.
88
 Two centuries later, King Sejong of 
the Yi (or Choson) dynasty directed the creation of Hangul, the indigenous 
Korean alphabet
89
 and “the most remarkable writing system ever invented.”90 
But the government did not provide formal protection of authors’ works in 
the five centuries of the Yi dynasty ending in the beginning of the twentieth 
century.
91
 Even after independence from Japanese colonial rule in the 
1940s,
92
 Korea did not enforce to any degree either the Japanese copyright 
laws that were left intact
93
 or a similar copyright act that the National 
 
 
particularly in East Asia. ALFORD, supra note 2, at 113; Alford, supra note 74, at 14. See also 
Wineburg, supra note 84, § 1.01, at 1-2 (“[I]ntellectual property rights and their protection . . . is now 
an essential element of economic growth.”). With respect to China, Professor Alford questions the 
wisdom of equating the protection of intellectual property rights with the likes of weapons of mass 
destruction and human rights. “[T]here is something somehow out of whack about putting [Mickey 
Mouse] up there with nuclear war and torture.” Alford, supra note 74, at 14. 
 87. Alford, supra note 74, at 17. 
 88. See ANDREW C. NAHM, KOREA, TRADITION & TRANSFORMATION: A HISTORY OF THE 
KOREAN PEOPLE 79 (1988). See also KI-BAIK LEE, A NEW HISTORY OF KOREA 170 (1984) (Edward 
W. Wagner & Edward J. Shultz trans., 1984). But see ALFORD, supra note 2, at 1 (noting scholars’ 
credit of Chinese “with having contributed . . . movable type . . . to humankind”). 
 89. See LEE, supra note 88, at 192; NAHM, supra note 88, at 119. Before Hangul, Koreans used 
Chinese characters for communication. Id. “Hangul Day,” for years a national holiday, is still observed 
annually, on October 9. 
 90. FLORIAN COULMAS, THE WRITING SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 118 (1989). 
 91. See Kyu Ho Youm, Copyright Law in the Republic of Korea, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 276, 
278-81 (1999). The Yi dynasty began in the closing years of the fourteenth century and lasted until the 
beginning of the twentieth century, when Korea became a Japanese protectorate. See NAHM, supra 
note 88, at 517, 521. The Japanese occupation left an impact that is still seen, as many of the Korean 
laws are Japanese-revised versions of the German civil law. See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND 
LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA 14 (Sang Hyun Song ed., 1983). 
 92. Korea was formally a colony of Japan from 1908 until the close of the Second World War in 
1945. See NAHM, supra note 88, at 521-22. 
 93. See Young Sik Song, General Application and Implementation: Legal Remedies Against 
Infringement, at 2, in KOREAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RESEARCH SOCIETY, INC., INTERNATIONAL 
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Assembly enacted in 1957
94
 to any degree.
95
 Few authors sought to advance 
their statutory copyright protections,
96
 “Korean courts paid little attention to 
copyright,”97 and the subject was “a nonissue” for many years.98 This was the 
period of government indifference
99
 and a “tradition of neglect.”100 
1. Cultural and Traditional Attitudes  
Commentators examining copyright (and intellectual property) in Korea 
have referred to the cultural norms that purportedly explain Korea’s 
traditional lack of appreciation of copyright.
101
 Scholars focused on these 
 
 
SYMPOSIUM ON THE NEW COPYRIGHT LAW: CHALLENGE OF THE NEW COPYRIGHT LAW IN A 
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT (1987) [hereinafter Song, Legal Remedies]. There is some irony here. 
There has been great resentment of Japan since Korea gained its independence. See generally BRIAN 
BRIDGES, JAPAN AND KOREA IN THE 1990S: FROM ANTAGONISM TO ADJUSTMENT (1993); SUNG-HWA 
CHEONG, THE POLITICS OF ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT IN KOREA: JAPANESE-SOUTH KOREAN 
RELATIONS UNDER AMERICAN OCCUPATION, 1945-1952 (1991). Yet many of the institutions that 
Japan implemented during its military occupation, including the court system, many of the substantive 
laws, and legal education, remain intact in Korea today. In recent years, occasional reports of 
improving relations between the two countries, see Lorien Holland & Chester Dawson, What If? The 
Dream of Korean Unification Could Be a Nightmare for the World’s Superpowers, FAR EASTERN 
ECON. REV., June 29, 2000, at 18, are tempered by the latest incident that fuels the continuing political 
and social tension, see Howard W. French, Japan’s Refusal To Revise Textbooks Angers Its Neighbors, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2001, at A3. 
 94. See Copyright Law, Law No. 433, Jan. 28, 1957, reprinted in UNESCO KOREAN SURVEY 
641-47 (1960) [hereinafter Korean Copyright Law] (current version at Copyright Act, Law No. 432, 
Jan. 28, 1957, amended by Act No. 3916 of Dec. 31, 1986, translated in VII STATUTES OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 1091 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. trans., 1997)). See generally KYUNG JAE 
PARK, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF KOREA 295-355 (1986); Youm, supra note 91, at 281-
82. Under this law, works of foreigners would receive copyright protection in Korea if first published 
in Korea or if the foreigner’s native jurisdiction had a treaty with Korea providing reciprocal coverage. 
Korean Copyright Law, supra, art. 46. See Youm, supra note 91, at 284. Few, if any, non-Korean 
authors could meet these conditions, and thus, had virtually no copyright protection in Korea. See id.; 
Min & West, supra note 13, at 563. 
 95. See Song, Legal Remedies, supra note 93, at 3. The Korean copyright law of the day was 
virtually “dead law,” with little enforcement. Youm, supra note 91, at 276 (quoting YOUNG-PYO JEON, 
CHULPAN MUNHWA WA CHAPJI CHONOLRIJUM [BOOK PUBLISHING AND MAGAZINE JOURNALISM] 504 
(1997)). Apparently, even government officials believed mistakenly that Korea did not have a 
copyright act. See Song, Legal Remedies, supra note 93, at 3. 
 96. Descriptions of the small number of cases involving copyright are available in Song, Legal 
Remedies, supra note 93, at 3-8. 
 97. Youm, supra note 91, at 288. 
 98. Id. at 278. “[F]ew Koreans had an opportunity to appreciate copyright in its practical sense.” 
Id. 
 99. See Song, Legal Remedies, supra note 93, at 3. 
 100. William Enger, Korean Copyright Reform, 7 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199, 213 (1990). 
 101. See Song, Legal Remedies, supra note 93, at 1; Sang-Hyun Song & Seong-Ki Kim, The 
Impact of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Intellectual Property Laws in Korea, 13 UCLA PAC. 
BASIN L.J. 118, 120 (1994); Wineburg, supra note 84, § 1.03, at 1-9 to 1-15; Damon Darlin, Where 
Trademarks Are up for Grabs: U.S. Products Widely Copied in South Korea, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 
1989, § 2, at 1. 
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norms in the 1980s when Korea, under pressure from the United States, 
agreed to a comprehensive overhaul of its copyright policy.
102
 If long-
standing cultural attitudes made copyright protection an alien concept in 
Korea,
103
 there were understandable questions as to whether Korea could 
make good on its pledge.
104
 As to the specifics of the culture that shaped the 
Korean mindset regarding copyright, the following are the salient features 
from the commentary: 
 During the five centuries of the Yi dynasty, Korea was steeped 




 the Confucian ways established an ordered society with 
divisible classes, in which the political leadership was chosen 
from the top class, consisting of scholars and gentry;
106
 
 Koreans viewed intellectual creations as public goods, rather 
than as private property, to be shared rather than exploited 





 102. See Park, supra note 18, at 168. Discussions held before 1985 were unsuccessful. See Enger, 
supra note 100, at 200; Gadbaw, supra note 26, at 272, 273. 
 103. Sang Hyun Song, Keynote Speech, at 1, in INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE NEW 
COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 93. Indeed, in Korea, “even the term ‘Intellectual property’ is very 
foreign.” Id. Traditionally, the term “industrial property” was used to refer to patents and trademarks. 
See Soo Kil Chang, A Memorandum on the Korean Industrial Property Rights, in BUSINESS LAWS IN 
KOREA: INVESTMENT, TAXATION AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 635, 635 (Chan-Jin Kim ed., 1982). 
Still today, organizationally, the Korean Industrial Property Office oversees noncopyright intellectual 
property matters. Korean Industrial Property Office, Missions of KIPO, at http://www.kipo.go.kr/ 
ehtml/eAboIndex03.html (mission includes “[e]xamination and registration of the patent, utility model, 
industrial design and trademark (including servicemark), policies on the protection of trade secrets, 
and registration of semiconductor chip layout designs”). Copyright matters are under the supervision 
of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (formerly, and most recently, the Ministry of Culture and 
Sports; Ministry of Culture and Information). See Copyright Act, Law No. 432, Jan. 28, 1957, art. 53, 
amended by Act No. 3916 of Dec. 31, 1986, translated in VII STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
1091 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. trans., 1997) [hereinafter Korean Copyright Act] (Copyright 
“registrations . . . shall be made by the Minister of Culture and Tourism.”); Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism, About the MCT: Bureau of Offices, at http://www.mct.go.kr/e_mct/sub1.htm (Ministry’s 
Cultural Policies Bureau includes Copyrights Division). 
 104. Park, supra note 18, at 166, 173. 
 105. This influence appears to be a matter of general knowledge and acceptance. See Wineburg, 
supra note 84, at 1-9 (“Most Asian societies are influenced by the Confucian ethic.”). Indeed, the 
Confucian influence on Korea was substantial: “[T]he Yi dynasty brought about a thorough 
Confucianization of Korea’s politics and political structure, social thoughts and institutions, as well as 
its economic, intellectual, and cultural patterns. In the end, Korea became more Confucian than 
Confucian China as its influence permeated every aspect of the life of the nation.” NAHM, supra note 
88, at 95. 
 106. See Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 120. 
 107. In 1986, Korea’s ambassador to the United States expressed this view directly. Kim, supra 
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 the copying of a scholar’s book was “not an offense, but instead 
a recommended activity, reflecting a passion for learning”;108 
indeed, the copying of a work was considered an honor;
109  
 authors gained and preferred “honorable status through 
authorship”110; Confucian values “devalue[d] the materialistic 
compensation of the literati.”111 
These features comprise the pertinent and prevailing culture of several 
centuries, which have continued,
112
 giving rise to a mindset that had little 
appreciation or need for a system of protecting the proprietary rights of 
authors.
113
 Likewise, the cultural forces explain why Korea did not 
traditionally adopt the rights-centered approach to copyright seen in 
common-law jurisdictions like the United States
114
 and why acceptance of 
copyright in Korea even after the 1986 improvements has been slow.
115
 
2. Korean Culture and Copyright Revisited 
The commentary that relies on culture to help explain the continuing 
piracy and the lack of appreciation of authors’ rights in Korea offers little 
elaboration of such culture. Few authors have attempted, for example, to 
break down the elements of the cultural attitudes,
116
 critique the applicability 
 
 
note 12, at 2 (“Historically, Koreans have not viewed intellectual discoveries or scientific inventions as 
the private property of their discoverers or inventors. New ideas or technologies were ‘public goods’ 
for everybody to share freely.”). The point has been frequently repeated by commentators on both 
sides of the Pacific. See, e.g., Gadbaw, supra note 26, at 283; Sang Jo Jong, Recent Developments in 
Copyright Law of Korea, 24 KOREAN J. COMP. L. 43, 47 (1996); Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 120; 
Darlin, supra note 101, at 1. See also Wineburg, supra note 84, at 1-10; Arthur Wineburg, 
Jurisprudence in Asia: Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 5 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 25, 26 
(1997) [hereinafter Wineburg, Jurisprudence in Asia]. 
 108. Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 120. See Wineburg, supra note 84, at 1-9; Wineburg, 
Jurisprudence in Asia, supra note 107, at 25. 
 109. See Gadbaw, supra note 26, at 283; Wineburg, supra note 84, at 1-9 (“copying is considered 
a high form of flattery”); Wineburg, Jurisprudence in Asia, supra note 107, at 25. 
 110. Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 120. 
 111. Youm, supra note 91, at 279. See Jong, supra note 107, at 47; Kim, supra note 12, at 2; Song 
& Kim, supra note 101, at 120; Song, Legal Remedies, supra note 93, at 1; Wineburg, supra note 84, 
at 1-9, 1-10; Wineburg, Jurisprudence in Asia, supra note 107, at 26. 
 112. See Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 120; Song, Legal Remedies, supra note 93, at 1. 
 113. Such a culture could even be “hostile” to the idea of copyright. See Wineburg, Jurisprudence 
in Asia, supra note 107, at 25. 
 114. Id. at 25-26. 
 115. Youm, supra note 91, at 279. 
 116. Professor Alford suggests a similar process of breaking down the American notion of 
property “into its constituent elements, rather than treat[ing] it as an undifferentiated whole that one 
either has or lacks.” Alford, supra note 74, at 17. 
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of traditional cultural norms to the current piracy situation, shed light on the 
various nuances of cultural beliefs, or suggest pertinent cultural trends in 
contemporary Korean society—all of which bear on the continuing piracy 
and slow development of copyright protection.
117
 This portion of the Article 
begins the discussion, ultimately toward a more searching and thorough 
study. 
If indeed the societal attitudes that influence the Korean appreciation of 
copyright are borne from centuries of tradition, it is altogether understandable 
that a society with such views would have little need or appreciation for legal 
recognition of the proprietary interests of the author. The notion of one 
person holding an exclusive right of exploitation of a work would indeed be 
alien. Yet the practice of relying on centuries-old cultural traditions as 
justification for actions in the industrialized setting of the twenty-first century 
entails some risk. One is reminded of Professor Alford’s caution that 
“avowedly cultural explanations” of a national intellectual property system 
tend to have an “unduly conclusory impact.”118 Granted, traditional attitudes 
affect contemporary thinking (especially in a society that is anchored more to 
the past than to the present or future)
119
 with regard to the rights of authors. 
Nevertheless, all societies evolve, and whereas some traditions are carried 
through the centuries to the present, others have merely residual presence in 





 117. In one notable exception, a study by two economists suggests that the “collectivist” 
orientation seen in Korean culture might explain its high piracy of software. See Donald B. Marron & 
David G. Steel, Which Countries Protect Intellectual Property? The Case of Software Piracy, 38 
ECON. INQUIRY 159 (2000). Marron and Steel note that national intellectual property protection 
policies depend partly on societal culture, and specifically that there is a correlation between a 
society’s collectivist (as opposed to individualistic) culture and piracy of software. Referring to 
Hofstede’s work on the cultural dimension of individualistic/collectivist orientation, see HOFSTEDE, 
CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES, supra note 41, Marion and Steel suggest that,  
[i]ndividualism both encourages and requires social institutions that protect individual rights. 
Chief among these are conceptions of individual ownership and equality before the law. 
Collectivism, in contrast, encourages institutions that favor close relatives, friends, and trusted 
associates (the “in-group”) over outsiders. Such institutions emphasize resource sharing rather 
than individual ownership; they also attribute different rights to insiders and outsiders.  
Marron & Steel, supra, at 166. For another discussion of the individual versus collective orientation, 
see Harry C. Triandis et al., Multimethod Probes of Individualism and Collectivism, in THE CONFLICT 
AND CULTURE READER, supra note 27, at 52-55. 
 118. ALFORD, supra note 2, at 6. 
 119. See infra text accompanying notes 323-25. 
 120. For instance, in the hierarchy of Confucian society, merchants—those in the business of 
buying and selling—were regarded as “‘inferior,’ greedy and dishonest,” occupying a status of 
“degradation and deprivation.” NAHM, supra note 88, at 101. See also DENISE POTRZEBA LETT, IN 
PURSUIT OF STATUS: THE MAKING OF SOUTH KOREA’S “NEW” URBAN MIDDLE CLASS 19 (1998) 
(“The low status attributed to . . . entrepreneurial activity . . . had a legal basis. During the Chosŏn 
dynasty yangban were prohibited by law from participating in . . . entrepreneurial activity . . . .”). 
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Confucian attitudes still influence Korean thinking and appear at the margins 
in the Korean copyright setting, many of the referenced traditions are 
outdated or of historical interest, and economic interests play a more 
determinative role. 
One Korean cultural attitude whose continuing applicability must be 
examined is the view that creations of the intellectual and creative mind are 
public goods, to be shared, not economically exploited privately by the 
author. Although the continuing prevalence of this view may well explain a 
societal attitude that the copying of books, software, and albums without the 
creator’s authorization is no vice,121 two developments from the 
contemporary setting are worth note. First, Korean commentary has 
emphasized the great success of the Korean government’s efforts since the 
copyright reforms of 1986 to educate the public on the concept of copyright 
and the author’s right to exclusive exploitation.122 As a result, “[t]here have 
been significant changes in the social attitudes towards intellectual property 
protection,”123 and there is now a “heightened status of copyright in 
Korea.”124 Secondly, in spite of these efforts, piracy has continued, and there 
is little to ameliorate Korea’s image as a main producer of international 
piracy.
125
 This situation suggests that either the Confucian conception of 
creative works as public goods is still strong and the characterizations of the 
awareness efforts are exaggerated, or as is advanced here, that other factors 
explain the piracy. In support of the latter proposition, for those producing 
copies of works, there is a point at which (whatever the current influence of 
Confucian thought) traditional practices and attitudes give way to modern 
commerce and to notions of private property, economic motivation, and 
realities of the marketplace. In Confucian society, an author’s work was 
considered a public good, and the task of printing copies for dissemination 
 
 
Times have changed. “[A]ttitudes toward commerce have been adapted to fit the requirements of a 
modern capitalist economy.” LETT, supra, at 208. 
 121. As late as 1994, the Korean media noted that the illegal copying of an author’s work is based 
“more on a lack of awareness among Korean consumers over the nature of copyrights than on a 
malicious disregard for copyrights.” Yoo Choon-sik, Young Engineer-Turned Software Developer, 
Manager Vies for Rising Opportunities, KOREA ECON. DAILY, Jan. 31, 1994, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, World Archive News File. 
 122. In 1996, Professor Sang Jo Jong reported the “broad array of activities [by the Korean 
government] to inform and educate the general public of the necessity and importance of intellectual 
property protection.” Jong, supra note 107, at 47. These included seminars, workshops, publications, 
“a copyright school where short courses on copyright are offered to the general public,” a public 
service video, lectures, and “two large rallies” attended by over 8,000 people each. Id. at 48. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Youm, supra note 91, at 298. 
 125. See Enger, supra note 100, at 209, 210. 
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was left exclusively to the government.
126
 In contemporary Korea, whatever 
the view that intellectual creations are for societal benefit, copies of such 
works are made and sold by private entrepreneurs. Copies are sold at their 
market value, and presumably, the ownership of the property is zealously 
guarded by its producers until timely payment has been made. The private 
exploitation suggests that the tradition of sharing public goods has given way 
to the modern notion of economic opportunity. Even when a society deeply 
rooted in Confucian traditions meets the present day reality of capitalism and 
economic opportunity, there is a question of how much such traditions 
dominate.  
Next, the copying and sharing of intellectual works purportedly serve a 
culturally inspired educational purpose of fulfilling “a passion for 
learning.”127 This attitude stems from the elevated status that scholars 
enjoyed in the hierarchical social and legal strata of traditional Confucian 
society.
128
 Perhaps the copying and distribution of scholars’ works allowed 
members of the lower classes to emulate those above. Although formal 
classes have long been abolished, the Confucian influence has left a deeply 
status-conscience society in Korea,
129
 with the highly educated enjoying 
commensurate status. One study notes, “The social importance of education 
is one of the major continuities between traditional and contemporary 
Korea.”130 The moral superiority that scholars possessed in the dynastic era is 
 
 
 126. See Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 120; Youm, supra note 91, at 278 (citing HAN SUNG-
HON, CHOJAKKWON UI POPJE WA SILMU [COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE] 25 (1988)). 
 127. Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 121; see Wineburg, supra note 84, at 1-9; Wineburg, 
Jurisprudence in Asia, supra note 107, at 26. 
 128. According to Confucian tradition, the people were divided into discrete classes. At the very 
top was “the scholar-gentry class called yangban, whose members controlled politics, sustained social 
morality and ethics.” NAHM, supra note 88, at 100. Below the yangban stratum was the chung-in 
(literally, “middle people”), “a group of petty central and local functionaries” that also included 
medical, scientific, and foreign language professionals.” Id. The chung-in “enjoyed certain privileges 
such as educational opportunities and political and social prestige, [but was] subservient to the 
yangban.” Id. at 100-01. Next in the hierarchy was the sang-in, the commoner class of “farmers, 
craftsmen, fishermen and merchants.” Id. at 101. This class comprised eighty percent of the 
population, with some hierarchy within this class itself. Id. The lowest class was the “ch’onmin, or the 
‘low-born’ or ‘inferior people.’” Id. at 101. Slaves, domestic servants, sorcerers, butchers, basket-
makers, and public entertainers were all members of this class. Id. 
 129. For a thorough and revealing look, see LETT, supra note 120. “[T]he assertion of status has 
become an important element in both the formation and the definition of its new urban middle class.” 
Id. at 1. 
 130. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, SOUTH KOREA: A COUNTRY STUDY 
98 (Andrea Matles Savada & William Shaw eds., 4th ed. 1992). “People at the top require blue-ribbon 
educational backgrounds, not only because education gives them the cultural sophistication and 
technical expertise needed to manage large, complex organizations, but also because subordinates will 
not work diligently for an uneducated person—especially if subordinates are educated themselves.” Id. 
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still seen in Korean society,
131
 and the “[u]niversity professor, the historical 
successor to the scholar of the Chosŏn dynasty, is among . . . the most 
prestigious of occupations in . . . Korea today.”132 Education is perhaps the 
single most important determinant of social status in contemporary Korea.
133
 
The societal emphasis on education explains various aspects of book 
piracy in Korea, namely: the prevalence of the practice in the higher 
education setting; the book publishers’ and buyers’ economic interest in the 
illegally copied materials; and the reported lack of aggressive enforcement of 
the copyright laws. The Korean university setting continues to be “a 
sanctuary to the unauthorized reproduction of books.”134 One report 
summarizes: “There are more than 30 universities in Seoul, concentrated into 
three main areas. Around the start of the academic terms . . . when students 
acquire their course materials, these areas become hotbeds of piracy.”135 One 
might argue that the copying and distribution of academic texts and works do 
advance knowledge, toward a more informed and educated citizenry. But it is 
not societal altruism that motivates the unauthorized copying and sales of 
pirated books. Rather, reproducers know that academic texts, exam 
preparation materials, and educational software
136
 are necessities in obtaining 
an education,
137





 131. See LETT, supra note 120, at 46. See id. at 159-60 (“Confucian doctrine places heavy 
emphasis on the importance of education. In the 1990s education, moral worth, and status were still 
linked in the minds of Koreans.”). A socially constructed sense of morality, or a complete lack of 
appreciation for copyright even in academia, would explain the following reported practice by Korean 
professors. “In a typical case, a university professor obtains a book from abroad, goes to a 
reproduction company to have it reprinted, then assigns his students to buy it—with a kickback from 
the printer to the professor.” Halloran, supra note 9, at 15. 
 132. LETT, supra note 120, at 46. 
 133. See SOUTH KOREA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 130, at 98 (“Education remained the 
single most important factor affecting social mobility in the 1990s . . . .”); LETT, supra note 120, at 
164 (“[A]cquisition of a university degree was the surest way . . . to acquire status.”). See also 
VINCENT S.R. BRANDT, A KOREAN VILLAGE: BETWEEN FARM AND SEA 95 (1971) (“Education is an 
important formal determinant of social status today.”); James Robinson, Social Status and Academic 
Success in South Korea, 38 COMP. EDUC. REV. 506, 512 (1994). The Korean obsession with education 
is such that what college one attends defines the person and impacts greatly on one’s career, 
occupation, and marriage potential. 
 134. Seoul Waging War Against Illegal Copying, KOREA TIMES, Apr. 6, 1999, available at 1999 
WL 5592060. 
 135. IIPA, 2001 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 10, at 218. “Photocopies are made in photocopy 
shops, and in some cases in vans which station themselves around campuses.” Id. 
 136. Especially those materials in English. During the Yi dynasty, “literacy in Chinese was a 
requisite skill of the cultivated man. Since then, English has replaced Chinese as a marker of status.” 
LETT, supra note 120, at 164. 
 137. There is also a widely accepted hierarchy of colleges. See SOUTH KOREA: A COUNTRY 
STUDY, supra note 130, at 98; Jeffrey Goldberg, The Overachievers, NEW YORK, Apr. 10, 1995, at 46. 
 138. See Shin Hye-Son, Crackdown on Software Piracy Wreaks Havoc for University Computer 
Courses, KOREA HERALD, May 4, 1999, available at 1999 WL 17748790; President Kim Orders 
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For the consumers—the nation’s college students and professors—there is 
also economic benefit in a situational necessity. Professors and students, who 
must have academic materials, benefit from reduced prices and thus support 
the piracy system.
139
 Finally, if a jurisdiction’s legal policies are an 
affirmation of the society’s values, the great importance Korean society 
places on education explains its leadership’s reluctance to aggressively 
enforce the copyright laws and prevent the piracy of books.
140
 It has been 
reported that Korean law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts “often fail to 
take book piracy seriously as a commercial crime”141 and that neither the 
Ministry of Education, which oversees the nation’s universities, nor the 
individual universities have done enough to discourage book piracy.
142
 
As an aside, the Confucian rationale, that copying assists in the pursuit of 
knowledge and honors the most learned and revered class, works best where 
the copied products are academic texts, books of poetry and literature, and 
educational software. This cultural tradition does not explain the copying of 
audio and video materials from the entertainment industry—recordings by 
singers and actors. Indeed, in traditional Confucian society, entertainers 
occupied the very lowest class, along with “such degraded professions” as 
butchers and grave diggers.
143
 “[A]rtists and musicians were traditionally 
looked down upon,”144 and this view persisted until only recently. Even 
today a derogatory term exists to refer to entertainers and theatrical folk: 
ddan-dda-rah.
145
 Nevertheless, another traditional practice explains the 
copying of the works of entertainers. Historically, in Korea, entertainers 
“created their artistic works without the intention of making money. In 
general, as they were [retained by] the noble classes, they created their works 
upon request, which means they did not produce their works for 
 
 
Crackdown on Pirating of College Textbooks, KOREA HERALD, Feb. 10, 1999, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News File. 
 139. See Gadbaw, supra note 26, at 281 (reporting that when Korean book publishers opposed 
proposed (and eventually adopted) copyright legislation in 1986, university professors joined in 
support); Sally Taylor, Korean Govt. Probing Continued Piracy, PUBLISHERS WKLY, Feb. 17, 1989, at 
56 (“[P]rofessors and students still support the pirate system.”). 
 140. In the 1970s, the Korean government had, in a paternalistic gesture, explicitly referenced the 
economic plight of its students in refusing cooperation with American requests. See Halloran, supra 
note 9, at 15 (“The Korean Government . . . has refused to clamp down on pirated editions within 
Korea . . . . One major reason . . . is that Korean students are poor and would be deprived of books 
they needed if they could not buy cheap editions.”). 
 141. IIPA, 2001 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 10, at 218. 
 142. See id. 
 143. NAHM, supra note 88, at 101. 
 144. Won Soon Park, The Korean Situation on Music Copyright, at 1, in INTERNATIONAL 
SYMPOSIUM ON THE NEW COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 93. 
 145. I thank Professor Hi Won Yoon, Seoul National University, Department of Korean Language 
Education, for assistance with the development and full meaning of this term. 
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Finally, commentators advance two additional cultural traits to explain 
the continuing piracy and the lack of appreciation for copyright in Korea: the 
copying of authors’ works honors and flatters them; and authors prefer 
cultural esteem over monetary compensation.
147
 These traits are more apt in 
the domestic setting where both nonauthors and authors understand and 
accept the cultural norms,
148
 but are far less apt in the international setting. 
Korean scholars of today, like their predecessors in the Yi dynasty, enjoy 
respect and envied status. They may well be honored by the copying of their 
works and prefer the affirmation of their status that such copying brings. But 
in the international (or transnational) setting, there is a question as to whether 
Korean reproducers intend to honor foreign authors. Foreign authors 
typically do not perceive the intended honor;
149
 to the contrary, they feel 
wronged and see the copying as an infringement of their sacred rights to 
property ownership.
150
 Likewise, the traditional practice of authors not 
seeking compensation for their works appears to have been held society-wide 
by both authors and nonauthors in Korea.
151
 Even in the late 1980s, Korean 
authors reportedly thought it “unworthy of them to make monetary profits”152 
 
 
 146. Park, supra note 144, at 1. This historical practice had the same practical effect as the “works 
made for hire” doctrine seen in U.S. copyright law, where absent agreement, “the employer or other 
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author” and owner, 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) 
(1994). A similar form of this doctrine exists in the current Korean copyright law. Korean Copyright 
Act, supra note 103, art. 9 (“When a work is made by an employee engaged in the affairs of juristic 
person, etc. in the course of duties and which is made under the name of relevant juristic person, etc., 
. . . under the planning of a juristic person, an organization or other employers . . . its author shall be 
the relevant juristic person etc., unless otherwise stipulated in a contract or the work regulations, etc. 
. . . .”). 
 147. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11. 
 148. Such traits are most applicable in a society like Korea, with a highly homogeneous 
population and a long, shared history with little external interference. These are common 
characteristics of cultures that tend to be more high (versus low) context cultures. See Stella Ting-
Toomey, Toward a Theory of Conflict and Culture, in THE CONFLICT AND CULTURE READER, supra 
note 27, at 46-51. In general, “high-context cultures . . . refer to groups of cultures that value group-
identity orientation, covert communications codes . . ., and maintain a homogeneous normative 
structure with high cultural demand/high cultural constraint characteristics.” Id. at 46-47. In contrast, 
“low-context cultures . . . refer to groups of cultures that value individual orientation, overt 
communication codes . . ., and maintain a heterogeneous normative structure with low cultural 
demand/low cultural constraint characteristics.” Id. at 46. Korea is seen as situated towards the high-
context end of the spectrum, the United States the low-context. Id. at 47. 
 149. With respect to American authors, the prospect of an intention to honor or flatter is more 
questionable in light of the continuing anti-American sentiment in recent years. See infra text 
accompanying notes 307-22. 
 150. Of course, there may be authors of all nationalities who take a more Confucian approach to 
their works, that is placing a greater value on advancing knowledge than on receiving compensation. 
 151. In any event, those authors that broke this mold and sought some compensation did so 
through conciliation, rather than litigation. See Song, Legal Remedies, supra note 93, at 1. 
 152. Id. “Those engaged in scholarly and artistic profession avoided the monetary disputes over 
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and did not “see themselves as a ‘group’ engaged in a commercial 
venture.”153 Yet again, this component is absent in the international setting, 
where foreign authors usually hold a different view.
154
  
The point is taken that those in Korea who copy works of foreign authors 
without authorization do not conduct their activities in conformance with a 
prescribed comprehensive cultural checklist, and that the above discussion 
may be somewhat hypertechnical in its treatment of the cultural dimension. 
Nevertheless, the discussion highlights the dangers of relying on culture 
globally to explain contemporary practices. When traditional culture meets 
the industrial age, it is not clear when culture applies and when it does not. 
Some cultural forces become more dominant than others, and the meeting of 
culture and modernization unearths inconsistencies and questions.
155
  
Although Confucian traditions can be seen at the margins, economic 
interest emerges as the more dominating factor in the Korean piracy 
situation. As in other societies, new technology has made copying easier in 
Korea.
156
 As a simple matter of economics, given necessary demand, those 
with the means to copy are more likely to profit from selling unauthorized 
copies at high volume than to pay for a license and sell fewer copies at higher 
prices. A part of the Korean culture sheds light on the economic motivation. 
As discussed above, Korea is a deeply status-oriented society. Although 
education is an important factor in determining status, in recent years, “status 
 
 
their published works because they traditionally valued the spirit of nobility until recent years as 
members of the cultural elite . . . .” Youm, supra note 91, at 279 (quoting Yong-Sik Song, Problems 
with the Current Copyright Law (I), 19 PYONHOSA [LAWYER] 181, 182 (1989)). 
 153. Gadbaw, supra note 26, at 283. This view is consistent with the honored but humbled and 
economically disinterested Asian author. See Wineburg, supra note 84, at 1-10; Wineburg, 
Jurisprudence in Asia, supra note 107, at 25-26. 
 154. The notion that all authors, whatever their society of origin, ought to be honored by the 
copying and wide distribution of works suggests a sense of ethnocentric attitude. Ethnocentrism refers 
to the tendency “to interpret or to judge all other groups and situations according to the categories and 
values of our own country,” SHARON RUHLY, ORIENTATIONS TO INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION 
22 (1976), or “to think the characteristics of one’s own group or race superior to those of other groups 
or races,” HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES, supra note 41, at 25 (quoting J.A. DREVER, A 
DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 86 (1952)). 
 155. Literal application of the Confucian traditions to the twenty-first century international setting 
presents a riddle that highlights the clash of culture. If intellectual works are goods for the public, and 
hence, in the public domain, any member of consuming society could do with it what she wishes. This 
membership would include private entrepreneurs who wish to exploit the goods for their own profit, 
subject to market supply and demand. Thus, applying traditional attitudes, any member of the public 
would be allowed to exploit the goods (because they are in the public domain), except the owner, 
because of the traditional view that literati ought not meddle in matters of compensatory reward. 
 156. Ironically, a society credited with producing the first movable printing press in the thirteenth 
century did not become known as a leading piracy jurisdiction until the middle of the twentieth 
century. 
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has also come to depend more on differences in wealth.”157 Whereas other 
determinants are irreversible after a certain point, wealth is the most 
malleable. Expression of wealth through materialism, for example, is 
decidedly not Confucian,
158




3. Domestic Resistance to Copyright Reform 
The deliberations that ultimately resulted in the comprehensive new 
copyright law in 1986 demonstrated the economic interest in the piracy 
situation. Commentator R. Michael Gadbaw’s review of the intellectual 
property reforms is telling. He notes that Korean publishers depend greatly 
on the sale of pirated textbooks; therefore, they generally oppose copyright 
protection.
160
 The Korean Publishers’ Association, an organization whose 
membership profits from unauthorized copying and sales of books, publicly 
argued against enhanced copyright protections because “not only would book 
prices rise substantially . . ., but their members would also be burdened with 
large royalty payments.”161 Likewise, software companies opposed 
legislation providing more protection of computer programs, “partly out of 
fear that their employees would leave to form their own companies,”162 
which presumably would increase competition. Furthermore, as both 
publishers and software companies were significant importers rather than 
exporters of works, they would benefit from limited copyright protection of 
 
 
 157. LETT, supra note 120, at 40 (citing Clark W. Sorensen, Ancestors and In-Laws: Kinship 
Beyond the Family, in ASIA’S CULTURAL MOSAIC: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 118, 144 
(Grant Evans ed., 1993)). 
 158. One subject that the Master seldom spoke of was profitableness. See THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
CONFUCIUS 62 (James Legge trans., 1953).  
 159. The drive for economic wealth toward enhancing one’s status taken to excess can, of course, 
lead to conspicuous consumption. See LETT, supra note 120, at 104. Then there is the survey taken of 
a congregation of a church in Seoul, in which respondents were asked to identify the primary reason 
for turning to their Christian faith. Less than thirty-one percent identified healing as the primary 
reason, while over thirty-seven percent referred to material blessings. See Andrew E. Kim, Korean 
Religious Culture and Its Affinity to Christianity: The Rise of Protestant Christianity in South Korea, 
61 SOC’Y OF RELIGION 117, available at 2000 WL 21849785 (citation omitted). Scripture is not 
lacking in supporting text. See Job 8:7 (“Your beginnings will seem humble, so prosperous will your 
future be.”); id. 22:21 (“Submit to God and be at peace with him; in this way prosperity will come to 
you.”). 
 160. Gadbaw, supra note 26, at 281. 
 161. Id. “Korean publishers have consistently claimed that the protection of foreign copyrights 
will cause severe, even fatal damage to the local publishing industry.” Id. at 280 (quoting Ian Taylor, 
How To Prepare for the New Environment, in INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE NEW COPYRIGHT 
LAW, supra note 93, at 22-23). 
 162. Id. at 281. 
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Gadbaw reports that although there was “[v]isible support”164 for 
legislation improving copyright protection from organized groups 
representing writers, music authors and composers, and record makers and 
sellers, their influence was limited.
165
 The “extensive domestic opposition far 
outweighed internal support.”166 Because author groups traditionally did not 
see themselves as engaged in a commercial venture and because Korean 
copyright law was inadequate, these groups did not have the lobbying 
presence of their counterparts in the United States.
167
 However, the Korean 
publishing industry, which stood to gain from less rather than more copyright 
protection, as well as consumers who could benefit from reduced prices, 
apparently had more influence.
168
  
C. Summary: A Common Interest in Property  
In summary, the American demand for protection of works by authors 
and the continuing rampant piracy in Korea both demonstrate the 
preservation of economic interest. Still, culture helps to explain the 
motivation behind the economic interest. In the United States, property 
ownership is related to economic wealth (which is a determinant in social 
status, of course)
169
 and the desire for property. In contrast, in status-oriented 
Korean society, economic wealth is a factor in determining social standing. 
Stated another way, where American culture may see the desire of property 
and economic wealth as an end itself, Korean culture sees economic gain 
more as a means to a different end—enhanced standing in the social 
hierarchy. This approach helps to explain the continuing piracy in Korea 
 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 282. 
 165. These groups were, respectively, the Korean Society of Authors, the Korean Music 
Copyright Association, and the Korean Phonograms Association. Id. at 283-84. 
 166. Id. at 276. 
 167. In the case of authors, contributing to the limited role is the traditional trait of authors not 
seeing themselves as engaged in a commercial venture. The Korean Phonograms Association directed 
its energies to the passage of the Phonogram Act instead. Id. at 284. 
 168. In a fascinating analysis, Gadbaw offers a quantitative assessment of the “political pressure” 
that publishers, authors, and other groups put on the Korean government with respect to copyright 
legislation. Id. at 278, tbl. 8.1. Not surprisingly: “Violators” (presumably, publishers) and 
“Consumers” exerted pressure to reduce protection; “Innovators” (writers, authors, composers and 
record producers) put pressure to improve protection; and “Trading Co[mpanies]” took no position. Id. 
Interestingly, Gadbaw notes, without elaboration, that the political influence of the consumers and 
“Violators” is measurably higher than that of the authors, composers, and the recording industry who 
urged enhanced copyright protection. Id. 
 169. Although American society is conscious of social status, it does not have the deeply rooted 
history of class over centuries of time that Korea does. 
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against American objections. 
The discussion above questions whether the cultural factors previously 
advanced to explain the piracy situation are still applicable, and also urges 
awareness of cultural traits to explain aspects of the piracy situation in Korea. 
This balanced appreciation will be necessary for U.S. representatives in 
future negotiations. Also important is an understanding of the cultural 
attitudes reflected in current Korean copyright law and policy, addressed in 
the following discussion. 
III. KOREAN COPYRIGHT AT THE NEW CENTURY: SOMETHING OLD, 




The current Korean copyright system—in law and practice—appears to 
reflect on the one hand attributes of both American and Korean culture, and 
on the other, a practical urgency of a national society long steeped in 
(pen)insular traditions seeking acceptance in the international legal and 
market arena. The textual copyright law of Korea
171
 incorporates much of the 
property-oriented approach to copyright seen in the U.S. counterpart. The 
Korean cultural influence is most evident in the protections of the author’s 
moral rights
172
 and procedures for the out-of-court resolution of copyright 
disputes.
173
 The Korean act also provides for a mechanism to educate the 
Korean public on the new copyright regime.
174
 Korea appears to be hurriedly 
attempting to transform itself from a traditional society with little 
appreciation for copyright toward one with a modern copyright system 




 170. For a discussion of the origin of this phrase, see A DICTIONARY OF SUPERSTITION 42-43 
(Iona Opie & Moira Tatem eds., 1989). With respect to the current Korean copyright system, there are: 
traditional Korean cultural attitudes (something old); emphasis of the author’s property rights in 
copyright (new, borrowed); statutory provisions adapted from the German and Japanese civil codes 
(borrowed); and protection of the works of foreign, that is, American, authors (red, white, and blue). 
 171. The Korean Copyright Act is the main Korean copyright statute. The Computer Programs 
Protection Act, Act No. 6233, Jan. 8, 2000, available at  http://www.moleg.go.kr/mlawinfo/english/ 
htms/law28.html, enacted at the same time as the Copyright Act and which provides for copyright 
protections of computer programs specifically, Sound Records, Video Products, and Game Software 
Act, Act No. 5925, Feb. 8, 1999, amended by Act No. 6186, Jan. 21, 2000, translated in VII STATUTES 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 901 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. trans., 1997), comprise the 
jurisdiction’s statutory copyright regime. See Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 123-24. 
 172. See infra text accompanying notes 229-46. 
 173. See infra text accompanying notes 247-62. 
 174. See infra text accompanying notes 267-68. 
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A. The Author’s Property Rights  
A comparative appreciation of the Korean copyright law first requires an 
understanding of the salient features of its American counterpart. The U.S. 
Copyright Act of 1976, with subsequent amendments, represents the current 
state of American copyright.
175
 The act gives “the owner of copyright”176 (the 
author or one to whom she has transferred the copyright),
177
 the exclusive 
rights for a statutory term
178
 to reproduce and distribute copies of the 
copyrighted work.
179
 A broad category of works can receive copyright 
protection.
180
 A central tenet of copyright law is that copyright protection 
does not apply to authorship of mere ideas.
181
 The statute provides no 
definition of “author,” but the term is understood to be broad;182 the “work 
made for hire” doctrine183 delimits the definition by denying authorship 
status to those who prepared their works within the scope of employment or 
by special order or commission.
184
 There are limitations to the exclusive 
 
 
 175. Pub. L. No. 94-553, Title I, § 101, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). Congressional authority is taken from the “copyright clause” of the 
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to promote “the . . . 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective 
writings”). 
 176. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). See id. § 101 (defining “Copyright owner”). 
 177. Id. § 201(d)(1)-(2). “The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by 
any means of conveyance or by operation of law,” and “[a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised in a 
copyright . . . may be transferred . . . and owned separately.” Id. 
 178. Generally, the rights subsist from the creation of the work, for a duration of the life of the 
author plus seventy years. The statute provides for succession of the copyright interest upon the 
author’s death. See id. § 302. 
 179. Id. § 106. The author also has the right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted 
work, and in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic or similar works, to perform and 
display the work publicly. Id. 
 180. “Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression,” including literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, 
sculptural, audiovisual, and architectural works, as well as motion pictures and musical pantomimes. 
Id. § 102(a). Computer programs also receive protection. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 81, 
§ 2.04[C], at 2-51 to 2-52.4. See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining “[c]omputer program”). The 
U.S. Copyright Office began registering computer programs in 1964. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175, 194 n.2 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 11 COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA BULL. 361 (1964)). 
For a historical development of copyright protection of computer programs, see Arthur R. Miller, 
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is 
Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 978 (1993). 
 181. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). 
 182. See generally Russ VerSteeg, Defining “Author” for Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1323 (1996). 
 183. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining “work made for hire”). 
 184. “In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was 
prepared is considered the author . . . and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a 
written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 201 
(1994). The doctrine is based on the rationale that an employee’s work is under the control of her 
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rights, principally the “fair use” doctrine,185 which allows the public’s limited 
use of the works without the owner’s authorization or compensation when 
policy reasons justify it, as well as certain other exempted uses.
186
 The act 
provides for a cause of action for the copyright owner against infringement of 
her exclusive rights
187
 and provides for various remedies.
188
 The act also 
allows criminal penalties for infringers,
189
 though historically, prosecutors 
apply them infrequently.
190
 Foreign authors may receive protection in a 
number of ways, but most generally, if the author “is a national [or] 
domiciliary . . . of a treaty party.”191 In prior comparative commentary, 
 
 
employer. See generally Dennis Angel & Samuel W. Tannenbaum, Works Made for Hire Under S. 22, 
22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209 (1976). 
 185. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such used by 
reproduction in copies . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . ., 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”). Factors to be considered in 
determining whether use is fair use include: 
(1) [T]he purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes;  
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
Id. 
 186. See id. §§ 108-12 (providing limitations on exclusive rights for reproductions by libraries and 
archives; transfer of particular copy or phonorecord; exemptions of certain performances and displays; 
secondary transmissions; ephemeral recordings). 
 187. Id. § 501(b). 
 188. They include injunctive relief, impounding of the infringing articles, damages, and costs and 
attorney’s fees. See id. §§ 502-05. 
 189. Criminal liability requires willful infringement of a copyright either for “purposes of 
commercial advantage or private financial gain” or by the reproduction or distribution of a 
phonorecord or copyrighted work that has a total retail value of more than $1,000. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) 
(Supp. IV 1998). 
 190. Historically, the criminal provision served a mainly deterrent purpose; prosecutions for 
copyright infringement were rare. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 81, § 15.01[B][2], at 15-17. See 
also Ting Ting Wu, Comment, The New Criminal Copyright Sanctions: A Toothless Tiger, 39 IDEA 
527 (1999) (reporting sixty-eight criminal infringement cases out of 3,300 reported cases from 1948 to 
1997). Recent amendments to 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) make criminal prosecution of copyright violations 
easier. See No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). The question remains whether the amended provisions will see an 
increase in prosecutions. 
 191. 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). “A ‘treaty party’ is a country or intergovernmental 
organization other than the United States that is a party to an international agreement.” Id. § 101. Of 
relevance here, the United States is a party to the Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright 
Convention, the Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized 
Duplication of Their Phonograms, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
art. 6bis, as last revised, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 235; Universal Copyright 
Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 
943 U.N.T.S. 132; Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized 
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scholars have described the U.S. copyright system as one that emphasizes the 
economic and pecuniary distribution of rights.
192
 Such a system is 
appropriate in a culture that desires and values property and expects laws that 
protect property rights.  
The Copyright Act of Korea
193
 enacted in 1986, as subsequently 
amended, adopts many of the essentials of the U.S. counterpart, with obvious 
parallels and functional equivalents.
194
 Most notably, the act provides for juh-
jak-jeh-san-gwon—literally, “author’s property rights”195—and repeatedly 
uses the very phrasing throughout the act.
196
 The author’s rights197 include 
the right of reproduction, public performance, broadcasting, transmission, 
exhibition, distribution, and production of derivative works.
198
 Such rights 
are transferrable, with the transferee standing in place of the author.
199
 As 
with American copyright, a broad category of works can receive copyright 
 
 
Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
 192. Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 79, at 2; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The 
Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 
59 (1994). See YOUNG SIK SONG, JI-JUHK-SOH-YOO-KWON [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] 972 (1994) 
(describing American copyright as protecting property rights by focusing on economic value). 
 193. Korean Copyright Act, supra note 103. The Korean constitutional counterpart to the U.S. 
copyright clause reads: “The rights of authors . . . and artists shall be protected by Act.” KOREA 
CONST. art. 22(2), Oct. 29, 1987, art. 22(2), translated in I STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 5 
(Korea Legislation Research Inst. trans., 1997). 
 194. A helpful guide to Korean copyright law appears in Joon K. Park, South Korea, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA 337, 348-53 (Alan S. Gutterman & Robert Brown eds., 
1997). 
 195. The “author’s property rights” phrasing is absent in the prior Copyright Law, supra note 94. 
Ironically, although this Article argues that the U.S. copyright interest is a form of the property right so 
valued in American culture, it is the Korean (not American) statutory text that emphasizes this 
“property” phrasing. On this note, left to another day is a study of the Korean legal protection of 
tangible property, relative to that of intellectual property. A sketch of the American debate over 
extending property protection to copyright is provided supra text accompanying notes 73-82. 
 196. See Korean Copyright Act, supra note 103, §§ 5, 6, 7, 8; arts. 11(2), 22, 23(3), 36(1) (twice), 
36(2), 37(1) (twice), 38 (twice), 40, 41(1), 41(2), 42(1), 42(3), 44, 45(1) (four), 45(3) (twice), 45(4) 
(twice), 46.1, 46.2, 47 (title), 48 (twice), 50 (twice), 51(1), 52.1 (twice), 52.2, 60(2), 60(3), 74(1), 
74(2), 77, 78(3), 93(1) (twice), 93(2) (twice), 93(3), 94, 97 (twice). 
 197. Generally, the rights are for a duration of the life of the author plus fifty years. See id. art. 
36(1). The English translation of the statute does not specify that the author’s rights are exclusive. 
Korea, however, has confirmed the exclusive nature of the rights. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
COUNCIL FOR TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, REVIEW OF 
LEGISLATION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA § IV.A.3 (Sept. 27, 2000) [hereinafter REVIEW OF LEGISLATION, 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA] (Korea’s Responses to Questions Posed by the European Communities and the 
Member States) (“[I]t is an author alone that has exclusive rights concerning the use of his works and 
enjoys the benefits flowing from use.”). 
 198. Korean Copyright Act, supra note 102, arts. 16-21. 
 199. Id. art. 41 (except for right to production of derivative work). 
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 Also similarly, the Korean equivalent of the work made for hire 
doctrine
201
 limits the rather broad definition of “author.”202 The author’s 
rights are subject to similar limitations seen in the U.S. equivalent.
203
 The 
Korean law also provides for “redress for infringement of rights,” which sets 







separate section provides for criminal penalties,
207
 which must be requested 
by the author.
208
 Works of foreign authors may receive protection in Korea 
under various scenarios, but principally, “in accordance with the treaties to 
which the Republic of Korea has acceded or which it has ratified.”209 Korea 
joined the Universal Copyright Convention
210
 and the Geneva Phonograms 
Convention
211
 in 1987; the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
212
 (by membership in the World Trade 
 
 
 200. “Work means a creative production belonging to the category of original literary, scientific or 
artistic works.” Id. art. 2(1). Examples are  
novels, poems, theses, lectures, recitations, plays and other literary works; . . . [m]usical works; . . . 
[t]heatrical works including dramas, dances, pantomimes . . . paintings, calligraphic works, 
sculptures, crafts, works of applied art, and other artistic works; . . . [a]rchitectural works including 
architectural models and design drawings; [p]hotographic works including photographs and other 
works produced by similar methods; . . . [c]inematographic works; . . . [m]aps, charts, design 
drawings, sketches, models and other diagrammatic works; and . . . [c]omputer program works. 
Id. art 4(1). Before the 1986 overhaul of the copyright laws, there was some question as to whether 
computer programs could receive copyright protection. The revised copyright act explicitly states that 
computer programs are copyrightable subject matter, and that protections are provided in a separate act 
(the Computer Programs Protection Act). See id. art. 4(1)9, 4(2). For discussion of the development of 
copyright protection of computer programs in Korea, see Young-Cheol Jeong & Yoong Neung Kee, 
Protection and Licensing of Software in Korea, 8 No. 7 COMPUTER LAW. 25 (1991); Young A. Lee, 
Recent Developments in Korean Law with Notes on the Protection of Computer Software, 15 KOREAN 
J. COMP. L. 186 (1987); Byungkwon Lim, Protection of Computer Programs Under the Computer 
Program Protection Law of the Republic of Korea, 30 HARV. INT’L L.J. 171 (1989); Byoung Kook 
Min & Gary Sullivan, Recognition of Proprietary Interests in Software in Korea: Programming for 
Comprehensive Reform, 8 MICH. YEARBOOK INT’L LEGAL STUDIES 49 (1987). 
 201. Korean Copyright Act, supra note 103, art. 9 (providing that authorship of work by employee 
in course of duties and made public under name of legal person, organization or employer is to be 
attributed to legal person). 
 202. “‘Author’ means a person who creates the works.” Id. art. 2(2). 
 203. Id. arts. 22-35 (under “Limitations to Author’s Property Rights,” including judicial 
proceedings, education purpose, news reporting, nonprofit performance, and private use). 
 204. Id. art. 91. 
 205. Id. art. 101. 
 206. Id. art. 93. 
 207. Id. art. 98. 
 208. Id. art. 102. 
 209. Id. art. 3(1). 
 210. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, revised 
July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 132. 
 211. Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized 
Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309, 866 U.N.T.S. 67. 
 212. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/3











Organization) in 1995; and the Berne Convention in 1996.
213
 
B. Cultural Norms 
The two provisions of the Korean copyright law that appear the most 
culturally derived relate to the protection of the author’s moral rights and the 
conciliation of disputes as an alternative to court litigation. Cultural 
differences between Korea and the United States likely explain why U.S. 
copyright law has substantially less emphasis on moral rights and no 
provision whatsoever governing alternative dispute resolution procedures.  
1. Moral Rights and the Author’s Honor 
The much discussed matter of moral rights in copyright
214
 seeks to protect 
the noneconomic, personal, or personality rights of the author. They include 
chiefly the right of disclosure of the work,
215
 the right of author attribution,
216
 
and the right of integrity of the work.
217
 Authors’ moral rights are most 
prominent in the continental countries,
218
 especially in France, which is home 






Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
 213. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 6bis, 
as last revised, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 235. 
 214. A recent discussion (and a recommended bibliography) is available in Ilhyung Lee, Toward 
an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795, 799 n.25 (2001). 
 215. As the creator of the work, only the author can determine when her work is complete and 
when it is ready for publication for public review. See Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A 
Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988); 
Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 79, at 5-6; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art 
Fares Post VARA, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) [hereinafter Kwall, How Fine Art Fares 
Post VARA]. 
 216. Once the work is published, this right ensures that the author (and no one else) will receive 
attribution as its creator. See Damich, supra note 215, at 7; Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, 
supra note 79, at 7; Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, supra note 215, at 1. 
 217. This right protects against significant alteration of the work or derogatory use of it that is 
contrary to the author’s intentions. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 81, § 8D.04, at 8D-49 to 8D-
57; Damich, supra note 215, at 15. The right of integrity is often considered the most central of moral 
rights. See 1 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 143 
(2d ed. 1987); Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, supra note 215, at 2; Neil Netanel, Copyright 
Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 
RUTGERS L.J. 347, 387 (1993); Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of 
Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 565 (1940). 
 218. For a discussion of moral rights protections in various civil law countries, see Adolf Dietz, 
The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 199 (1995). 
 219. For example, under French law, moral rights are exclusive to the author, inalienable (not 
subject to waiver or transfer), and perpetual. See generally Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the 
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In contrast, the United States historically has been unreceptive to adopting 
the moral rights doctrine, in part because of the view (often debated) that 
equivalent protections are available under various common-law theories, 
such as privacy, defamation, and unfair competition.
220
 The federal copyright 
law provides for the rights of attribution and integrity only to “work[s] of 
visual art.”221 Such rights may not be transferred, may be waived with 
consent of the author,
222
 and exist only for the duration of the author’s life.223 
Moral rights protections in the federal statute appear to be an after-thought, a 
begrudging accommodation to the supporters of authors’ rights who long 
clamored for formal recognition of the personality rights;
224
 however, some 
saw the protections as inadequate.
225
 In substance, the federal provisions 
indicate a congressional intention that moral rights occupy a secondary 
status. In addition to the limited categories of works and authors that receive 
moral rights protection under the law, such rights are subject to fair use,
226
 
and violations of moral rights (unlike violations of authors’ economic rights) 
are not subject to penal sanction.
227
 These limitations provide additional 
support for the characterization of U.S. copyright law as being based 
primarily on the allocation of proprietary and economic interests. It is a 





Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1 (1980); Jane Ginsburg, French Copyright Law: A Comparative Overview, 36 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 269 (1989); Arthur S. Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American 
Copyright Law—A Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 390-409 (1951); Raymond Sarraute, Current 
Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465 (1968). 
 220. Damich, supra note 215, at 35-76; Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 79, at 
17-34. 
 221. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). 
 222. Id. § 106A(e). 
 223. Id. § 106A(d). 
 224. Moral rights provisions are contained in § 106A, inserted between the section that provides 
for the various exclusive rights of the copyright owner and the first of several sections that provides for 
limitations to the such exclusive rights. Section 106A was added to the copyright act by virtue of the 
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 
5128. 
 225. E.g., Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of 
Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 945-46 (1990). 
 226. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1994). 
 227. Id. § 506(f). 
 228. Note Professor Paul Goldstein’s characterization of the differences in European and U.S. 
“copyright culture”:  
The European culture of copyright places authors at its center, giving them as a matter of natural 
right control over every use of their works that may affect their interests. . . . By contrast, the 
American culture of copyright centers on a hard, utilitarian calculus that balances the needs of 
copyright producers against the needs of copyright consumers, a calculus that appears to leave 
authors at the margins of its equation. 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 78, at 168-69. 
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Moral rights protections in Korea are a core component of the author’s 
protections in the jurisdiction’s Copyright Act.229 Korean moral rights 
provide for the triangular rights of disclosure, attribution, and integrity, 
without limitation to any category of authors.
230
 Such rights belong 
exclusively to the author,
231
 even after the ownership of copyrighted work 
transfers hands, and are perpetual, surviving the death of the author and 
passing to her estate.
232
 Importantly, the Korean copyright law explicitly 
provides that moral rights are not subject to fair use,
233
 and infringements of 
such rights are subject to criminal sanction.
234
 Although many Korean 
statutes generally are based on the German civil code (with Japanese 
modification),
235
 and the Korean moral rights provisions resemble those of 
the German and Japanese counterpart,
236
 this particular Korean act is not a 
matter of mere transplantation. Indeed, Professor Kyu Ho Youm states, 
“Koreans might have created their own version of moral rights as part of 
copyright regardless of whether their law was transplanted from Europe. This 
is culturally and legally in tune with Korean society.”237 The extent of the 
moral rights protections is a cultural relic of the traditional reverence for the 
scholar-author, which has extended to contemporary musicians and movie 
producers. With respect to the standard for assessing infringement of moral 
rights, although the Korean statute refers to the Berne Convention’s standard 
of prejudice to the author’s honor or reputation,238 some provisions of the 
statute equate violation of the author’s moral rights with defamation of the 
author.
239
 Under the Korean law, an author whose moral rights are violated 
 
 
 229. The principal provisions governing the author’s moral rights are included in articles 11 to 15 
of the Copyright Act. Korean Copyright Act, supra note 103, arts. 11-15. The author’s property rights 
are provided subsequently, in articles 16-21. Korean Copyright Act, supra note 103, arts. 16-21. 
 230. Korean Copyright Act, supra note 103, arts. 11-13. The general definition of authors (“the 
person who creates the works”) appears to apply, limited by the equivalent of the works made for hire 
doctrine. Id. art. 2(2). 
 231. Id. art. 14(1). But see Jong, supra note 108, at 45 (questioning rule of alienability in light of 
Jong v. Hotel Lotte, Inc., 92 Da 31309 (Korea Sup. Ct. 1992)). 
 232. Korean Copyright Act, supra note 103, arts. 14(2), 96. 
 233. Id. art. 35 (“No provisions of this Section [limitations on author’s property rights] may be 
interpreted as affecting the protection of authors’ moral rights.”). 
 234. Id. art. 98. 
 235. See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM IN KOREA, supra note 91, at 14. 
 236. See Youm, supra note 91, at 299 (“The moral rights aspect of the Copyright Act is directly 
influenced by the civil law system of continental Europe which Korea adopted through Japan.”). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 6bis, 
as last revised, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 235. 
 239. Korean Copyright Act, supra note 103, arts. 14(2), 98.2. See Youm, supra note 91, at 299. In 
contrast, the defamation claim to protect authors’ moral rights in the American courts has had only 
sparing success. See Damich, supra note 215, at 63-65; Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra 
note 79, at 22-25. 
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has an assortment of “preventive measures and restorative actions”240 that she 
may seek. In addition to compensation for damages,
241
 she may seek criminal 
punishment
242
 and “measures necessary for the restoration of [her] 
reputation.”243 Korean authors are said to prefer respect for authorial 
personality over economic profit and see criminal sanctions as the better 
form of punishment for those who infringe their moral rights.
244
 This 
preference is another carry-over from the era when scholar-authors favored 
confirmation of their status through proper publication over economic 
benefit.
245
 In any case, a review of the cases decided by the Korean courts 
indicates that litigation involving the author’s moral rights comprises a 
significant portion of the decisional law.
246
 
2. Preference for Conciliation  
The Korean copyright act also establishes a Copyright Deliberation and 
Conciliation Committee, an organization that, as the name suggests, is to 
“deliberate matters concerning copyright and conciliate disputes concerning 
the rights protected under this Act.”247 Regarding the conciliation function, 
the Act establishes a division within the Committee that is to conduct 
 
 
 240. Youm, supra note 91, at 294 (describing court’s characterization of remedies available under 
Copyright Act in Korean Broadcasting Corp. v. Han, 92 Na 35846 (Seoul High Ct. 1994). 
 241. Korean Copyright Act, supra note 103, arts. 91(1), 92(2). 
 242. Id. art. 98.2. 
 243. Id. art. 95. 
 244. See Youm, supra note 91, at 299. Of interest is the relief sought in Han v. Korean 
Broadcasting Corp., 90 Kaham 1404 (Seoul District Court 1992), aff’d, 92 Na 35846 (Seoul High 
Court 1994), discussed in Youm, supra note 91, at 292. In Han, a television company had broadcast an 
edited version of a sociology professor’s lecture, deleting one-third of the original one-hour lecture. 
The professor alleged that the “unreasonably” edited broadcast damaged his scholarly reputation, and 
sought a rebroadcast of the original lecture, broadcast of the trial court’s decision ruling in favor of the 
professor, a public apology, but no money damages. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s 
order of broadcast of the judgment in favor of the professor. Youm, supra note 91, at 292-93 (citing 
Han, 90 Kaham 1404). 
 245. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11. 
 246. See cases mentioned in Jong, supra note 107, at 45; Song, Legal Remedies, supra note 93, at 
3-7, 15-19; Youm, supra note 91, at 292-94. See also Copyright Deliberation and Conciliation 
Committee, About the Committee: Services—Deliberation and Conciliation, at 
http://www.copyright.or.kr:8080/index_en.asp?menu=13 (“The most frequent disputes are . . .: 
Disputes on author’s moral right[;] . . . Disputes concerning author’s property rights[;] . . . Disputes 
concerning neighboring rights[;] . . . Disputes concerning compensation to be paid to the performer 
and the phonogram producer by the broadcasting organization when broadcasting commercial 
phonograms.”). 
 247. Korean Copyright Act, supra note 103, art. 81(1). Members are to “have knowledge and 
experience in copyright matters and renowned for their virtues,” and are “nominated by the Minister of 
Culture and Tourism.” Id. art. 81(3). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/3











conciliation of copyright disputes
248
 and sets forth the procedures to be 
followed for such conciliation.
249
 This portion of the statute reflects what has 
been described as the cultural preference for conciliation over court 
adjudication.
250
 Indeed, the early commentary reflects a traditional distaste 
for litigation among Koreans.
251
 Again, Confucian ethics
252
 and Korean 
society’s value of harmony and peace engender this distate for litigation.253 
Koreans “tend to regard public conflict as being beneath their dignity,” and 
thus hesitate to resort to the judicial process.
254
 Although some members of 
Korean society still hold such sentiments, more recent commentary suggests 
that the trend is changing.
255
 In contemporary society, say observers, Koreans 
 
 
 248. Id. art. 83. See also Copyright Deliberation and Conciliation Committee, Conciliation: 
Information—Summary, at http://www.copyright.or.kr:8080/index_en.asp?menu=31 (“[I]n case a 
dispute arises regarding a copyright, it can be resolved, speedily and simply, without a trial through the 
advice of specialists, at a very low cost.”). Participation in the conciliation appears to be voluntary and 
the recommendations of the conciliation division nonbinding. See Korean Copyright Act, supra note 
103, arts. 85, 86, 87. For example, the conciliation is considered to have failed if a party refuses to 
attend. Id. art. 85(2). The conciliation is concluded by terms agreed to by the parties. Id. art. 86(1). The 
statute contemplates that a conciliation may not be reached at all. Id. art. 84(3). 
 249. Korean Copyright Act, supra note 103, arts. 84-88. 
 250. See PYONG-CHOON HAHM, KOREAN JURISPRUDENCE, POLITICS AND CULTURE 95-96 (1986); 
Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence of American Constitutionalism on South Korea, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 71, 
84 (1997). See also Austin Sarat & Joel B. Grossman, Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the 
Mobilization of Adjudication, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1200, 1208 (1975) (reporting “crude data” 
showing that Korea had lowest number of civil cases per population among selected countries). It 
makes intuitive sense that societies with a collectivist orientation, see supra note 117, tend to have 
lower rates of private litigation. Empirical studies to support this point appear to be unavailable, 
however. 
 251. A summary statement of the traditional sentiment, from an oft-quoted commentator: 
Koreans have abhorred the black-and-white designation of one party to a dispute as right and his 
opponent as wrong. Assigning all blame to one for the sake of rendering a judgment has been 
repugnant to the fundamental valuation of harmony, because such a judgment has retarded swift 
restoration of broken harmony. . . . [I]f discord could not be avoided, society demanded the 
quickest restoration of broken concord. For this purpose mediation has been preferred to 
adjudication because it does not require the fixing of blame. Parties themselves formulate the 
solution by mutual agreement, thus obviating the need for an external sanction. Since mediation is 
possible only when both sides are willing to compromise, each side has to give a little and to be 
satisfied with less than complete victory.  
HAHM, supra note 250, at 95-96 (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 177 (“A litigious man . . . threatens 
harmony and peace. He is a man to be detested. If a man cannot achieve reconciliation through 
mediation and compromise, he cannot be considered an acceptable member of the collectivity.”). 
 252. RAYMOND DAWSON, CONFUCIUS 71-73 (1981) (discussing “The Master’s antipathy to 
litigation”); Ahn, supra note 250, at 84. 
 253. HAHM, supra note 250, at 95-96; Jae-Jin Lee, Freedom of the Press and Right of Reply 
Under the Contemporary Korean Libel Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 
155, 191-92 (1998). 
 254. Lee, supra note 253, at 191-92. 
 255. See Ahn, supra note 250, at 84; Jeong-Oh Kim, The Changing Landscape of Civil Litigation, 
in RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS IN KOREAN LAW AND SOCIETY 321, 323 (Dae-Kyu Yoon ed., 2000); 
Chang Soo Yang, The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Korea, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 303, 
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are becoming more litigious, more willing to advance legal claims, and more 
willing to resort to the courts.
256
  
Thus, the establishment of a conciliation division and specified 
procedures for conciliation of copyright disputes is related to a cultural norm 
that (while still held in some quarters) is rapidly changing. Nevertheless, 
matters are submitted to the conciliation division, and the reported results of 
conciliations are informative.
257
 American reviewers may be particularly 
interested in the number of settlements that include a public apology as part 
of an agreement to resolve a dispute arising out of alleged copyright 
infringement.
258
 The inclusion of an apology toward the resolution of dispute 
is an important part of Korean culture,
259
 in contrast to the United States 
 
 
303 (1993). See also Ilhyung Lee, Expert Evidence in the Republic of Korea and Under the U.S. 
Federal Rules of Evidence: A Comparative Study, 19 LOYOLA L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 585, 591 
(1997). Survey data are informative. Whereas in the late 1960s, “[t]he vast majority of the population 
. . . ha[d] never been to a courthouse. . . . [and] were proud of that fact,” HAHM, supra note 250, at 98, 
a survey taken in the 1990s shows that nearly thirty percent of respondents had “been to court for 
‘legal problems’” and almost half “regard[ed] filing a suit for a money matter as a means of achieving 
justice or as a method of exercising their rights,” Korean Legislation Research Institute, A Survey on 
the Korean People’s Attitude Towards Law (Sang-Hyun Song trans.), in KOREAN LAW IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 128, 146 (Sang-Hyun Song ed., 1996). 
 256. Ahn, supra note 250, at 84; Kim, supra note 255, at 323. This litigiousness has led to an 
increasing docket and complaints from the bench of taxed judicial resources. See Ahn, supra note 250, 
at 84; Lee, supra note 255, at 591; Yang, supra note 255, at 309-10. It is of some moment to note the 
trend of Korea and the United States toward the traditional characteristics of the other, that is, a 
Confucian-influenced society (Korea) with a traditional preference for conciliation and distaste for 
litigation heading toward a “litigious zeitgeist,” Kyu Ho Youm, Libel Law and the Press: U.S. and 
South Korea Compared, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 231, 260 (1995), and a traditionally litigious and 
adversarial society (the United States) adopting more mechanisms to encourage nonlitigation 
resolution of disputes, see generally NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, 
POLICY, PRACTICE §§ 7:01 to 7:07, at ch. 7, page 1 to ch. 7, page 65 (2d ed. 1994). 
 257. Reported conciliations are available on the Committee’s Internet site. Copyright Deliberation 
and Conciliation Committee, Conciliation: Cases, at http://www.copyright.or.kr:8080/index_en. 
asp?menu=32 [hereinafter Conciliation: Cases]. A subject that requires further examination elsewhere 
is the degree of deference that Korean parties show to the conciliators and the tendency to agree to 
their recommendations, relative to, for example, a similar situation in the American setting. 
Differences in the cultural dimension of “power distance” could help to explain a higher tendency to 
defer and agree in Korea. See generally HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES, supra note 41, at 70-
71. In its purest form, power distance “is a measure of the interpersonal power or influence between 
B[oss] and S[ubordinate] as perceived by the least powerful of the two, S[ubordinate].” Id. 
 258. Conciliation: Cases, supra note 257. The Committee’s Internet site reveals that the parties 
reached a settlement in thirty of thirty-four matters submitted for conciliation. (The parties failed to 
agree in three matters; the result was unclear in the other.) Of the thirty, seven included an apology in 
the agreed terms of conciliation. Id. 
 259. See Dai-Kwon Choi, Freedom of Conscience and the Court-Ordered Apology for 
Defamatory Remarks, 8 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 205, 218-20 (2000) (criticizing Korean 
Constitutional Court’s holding, in defamation action against newspaper publisher, that portion of Civil 
Code that permits court-ordered apology as part of judgment is unconstitutional, as it is contrary to 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience). The apology is “a traditional, culture-bound means 
of remedying the damages” in certain cases. Id. at 224. 
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where “denial may be a central part of American culture.”260 In Korean 
settlement of conflicts and disputes, “an apology is functional as both a 
powerful facilitating factor and as a desired personality trait, particularly of 
the one who committed the wrong. These are cultural dictates placed on 
society and its members.”261 In contrast, the American discussion of 
including an apology toward dispute resolution has begun only recently.
262
  
C. Education, Awareness, Enforcement? 
As indicated above, the differences between the Copyright Act of Korea 
and the U.S. counterpart are not great; in fact, there is great similarity in 
textual content.
263
 The key distinction is that while the current American law 
and practice is the result of two centuries of development, the Korean law 
came suddenly in the 1980s at U.S. insistence.
264
 The success of the new 
Korean law depended on societal acceptance and compliance.
265
 Likely with 
this in mind, the Korean act charges the Copyright Deliberation and 
Conciliation Committee with the deliberation of copyright issues.
266
 
Practically, the Act gives the Committee the task of educating the public on 
the concept of copyright and enhancing the public’s awareness of the rights-
based copyright system that Korea has adopted.
267
 Such education and 
awareness programs are a matter of practical necessity for a culture that long 
had little need for or appreciation of copyright. Undoubtedly, “proper 
protection of the copyright works . . . cannot be truly obtained . . . unless the 
 
 
 260. Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical 
Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1472 n.96 (2000). Japan appears to be the only country that 
still allows for court-ordered apologies in defamation cases. See Choi, supra note 259, at 220. 
 261. Choi, supra note 259, at 219. 
 262. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999); 
Cohen, supra note 260. 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 176-213. 
 264. See infra text accompanying notes 301-03. 
 265. See Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 120-21. 
 266. See Korean Copyright Act, supra note 103, art. 81(1). Formally, matters for deliberation are 
those: concerning compensation of the author; arising under article 78(3); or “referred to the 
Committee by the Minister of Culture and Tourism or by three or more members jointly.” Id. art. 82. 
 267. To achieve these objectives, the Committee has provided training and educational facilities 
for businesses and has arranged “publicity activities.” Copyright Deliberation and Conciliation 
Committee, About the Committee: History, at http://www.copyright.or.kr:8080/index_en.asp? 
menu=11. See Copyright Deliberation and Conciliation Committee, About the Committee: Services—
Copyright Awareness Program and Publication, at http://www.copyright.or.kr:8080/index_en. 
asp?menu=13 (describing publication of materials on copyright law, and “PR campaign, which 
inspires respect for copyright by spreading information on the concept of copyright and effectiveness 
of the law, [and] ultimately seeks to aid in establishing a firm foundation of the society of knowledge 
and information.”). See also Jong, supra note 107, at 47-48 (reporting Korean government’s copyright 
awareness campaign). 
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society as a whole supports the[] concept and [its] importance.”268  
The government’s education of its people on the rights of a new copyright 
statute is one matter,
269
 enforcement of the law is another. Indeed, part of the 
agreement with the United States in 1986 required Korea to step up 
enforcement of the revised laws.
270
 The prospects for real enforcement would 
be questionable in a jurisdiction where the courts were “traditionally 
controlled by the executive branch, [and were] viewed as being unduly 
influenced by the ruling class.”271 Yet commentators note progress on this 
score as well.
272
 There were occasional reports in the late 1980s and early 
1990s of the government conducting large-scale raids and seizure of pirated 
goods and pressing criminal prosecutions.
273
 The closing years of the recent 
decade saw nearly annual increases in the number of raids, criminal 
prosecutions, convictions, and criminal penalties by fines and jail terms.
274
 
Americans wonder whether this trend reflects an effort by the Korean 
government toward genuine enforcement of a newly adopted copyright 
regime or merely well-timed efforts to avoid possible sanctions by the United 
States.
275
 This concern, which is raised in discussions between the two 
countries, is addressed in the next section. 
 
 
 268. Jong, supra note 107, at 43. 
 269. There is a question as to how successful the awareness campaign has been. As indicated 
above, reports of success of the awareness campaigns, such that copyright now occupies a “heightened 
status,” Youm, supra note 91, at 298, must be balanced with the continuing piracy that has occurred in 
Korea. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10. 
 270. Park, supra note 18, at 168 (citations omitted). 
 271. Youm, supra note 91, at 298. The “ruling class” apparently includes the media. Id. 
 272. Id. Professor Youm credits this progress in part to “Korea’s increasingly functional 
democracy.” Id. One American attorney, who served as a foreign legal consultant to a law firm in 
Korea for five years, commented on the tremendous progress the Korean courts have made over the 
years in deciding cases by applying the rule of law, especially in intellectual property litigation. 
Telephone interview with Glenn P. Rickards, Of Counsel, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Seattle, 
Washington (July 10, 2001). Others have lingering doubts. See, e.g., Jae Won Kim, The Ideal and the 
Reality of the Korean Legal Profession, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 45, 50 (2001), available at 
http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/pdfs/v2-02-Kim.pdf. 
 273. See East Asian Executive Reports, China, Thailand, Indonesia Among Countries Criticized 
for Inadequate Protection of Intellectual Property, Mar. 15, 1991; Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 
134. 
 274. REVIEW OF LEGISLATION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, supra note 198, § VI annex (Responses to 
Questions Posed by the United States). 
 275. Two observers say the latter, but add that the activities nevertheless “provided a turning point 
to the general public’s lax and vague idea of intellectual property rights and violations thereof.” Song 
& Kim, supra note 101, at 134. 
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IV. TOWARD RESOLUTION AND COMPROMISE: U.S.-KOREA 
NEGOTIATIONS 
This part, in two sections, is concerned with the matter of direct 
negotiations between the United States and Korea regarding copyright 
protection of American goods in Korea. The first section opens with a 
discussion of how the topic of culture could be raised and to what extent it 
should be considered in the negotiations. The section then offers each side’s 
possible reactions to the cultural norms of the other. Finally, this section 
addresses the other intangibles pertinent to the party discussions, namely, the 
general anti-American sentiment in Korea and the truncated, but significant, 
history of the relationship between the United States and Korea over 
intellectual property protection. With these matters in hand, the second 
section offers preliminary suggestions (rather than definitive proposals) on 
how the parties could benefit from the awareness of cultural and other 
pertinent factors to help resolve the piracy matter.
276
  
A. Lessons from the Cultural Divide (and Other Intangibles) 
1. What Consideration of Culture?: An Example  
In negotiations between the United States and Korea regarding the 
protection of American intellectual property rights on the Korean peninsula, 
an initial question for both sides is what consideration of culture is proper. In 
this regard, United States of America v. Yu is of interest.
277
 This case, 
although outside of the intellectual property arena, is informative in that it 
calls to question the consideration vel non of cultural differences between 
 
 
 276. Both Korea and the United States are parties to TRIPS, “the most comprehensive multilateral 
agreement on intellectual property,” Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The 
Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 392 (1996). TRIPS provides for resolution of 
disputes arising thereunder through “the integrated dispute settlement system of the World Trade 
Organization.” Id. at 411. However, TRIPS does not provide for the definitive resolution of all 
disputes for member nations. An agreement of the World Trade Organization contemplates and 
encourages resolution of disputes between nations through “[g]ood offices, conciliation and 
mediation.” Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, art. 5, 
33 I.L.M. 1230 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding on Settlement of Disputes]. (A term used most often 
in the international setting, “good offices” refers to the involvement of a third country or international 
organization toward settlement of a dispute between two countries. See BLACK’S 7th ed., supra note 
55, at 701.) The Understanding on Settlement of Disputes specifically covers disputes arising out of 
TRIPS. See Understanding on Settlement of Disputes, supra, app. 1. As neither the Understanding on 
Settlement of Disputes nor TRIPS contains any reference to consideration of culture in the resolution 
of dispute, this is left to the parties. 
 277. 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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Korea and the United States. Dr. Yu
278
 was a native of Korea who 
immigrated to the United States at forty-six years of age.
279
 He pled guilty to 
two counts of bribing a public official, an IRS examining agent, in the course 
of an audit of his and his wife’s joint tax return.280 At sentencing, Yu urged 
the district court for a downward departure from the range that the 
Sentencing Guidelines imposed, based on cultural differences between his 
native Korea and the United States.
281
 He made an offer of proof that, based 
on his Korean experience, the bribe was “an honorarium and that it could be 
viewed as an insult not to offer the payment.”282 The district court held that it 
had no discretion to take into account the cultural differences that Yu 
advanced and refused the downward departure on that ground.
283
 On appeal, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a divided opinion, agreed 
with the refusal of a downward departure and affirmed the district court’s 
sentence.
284
 The majority of the court decided that given the particular 
defendant—a resident of the United States for twelve years, a naturalized 
U.S. citizen, a professional tax preparer, and a successful businessman 






 278. The court opinion notes that Yu “is referred to as ‘Dr.,’ apparently on the basis of either [a 
doctorate degree obtained through a correspondence course] or one earned in Korea.” Id. at 953. The 
importance of status in Korean society is discussed supra text accompanying note 129-133. 
 279. Id. at 952. Note the possible cultural explanation in the reporting of Yu’s age in the opinion: 
“Yu was born in Korea in 1931 . . . . In 1976, when he was 46 years old . . . .” Id. (emphases added). 
The calculation of Yu’s age could have been a simple counting or typographical error by the court, by 
Yu’s counsel, or both. Alternatively, Yu could have insisted that his age was as indicated. It is not 
uncommon for Koreans to refer to their age in the traditional manner—that is, being considered one 
year old at birth, then adding a year of age at the beginning of every calendar year. Age is also 
determinant of seniority, and seniority is a factor in establishing one’s ever important status. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 953. Yu relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). 954 F.2d at 953. 
 282. 954 F.2d at 953. The government opposed Yu’s contention, arguing that “Yu could not 
reasonably rely on his Korean background” in light of his lengthy residence in the United States, and 
also that the downward departure he sought was barred by the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual § 5H1.10 (1998), which precludes consideration of national origin as a factor in the 
determination of a sentence. 954 F.2d at 953. 
 283. 954 F.2d at 953. “[T]he district court stated: ‘Just so that it’s clear I’m not exercising any 
discretion not to use a power that I have, I’m holding that I lack the power.’” Id. 
 284. Id. at 954. 
 285. Id. The majority also ruled that the facts of the case made it unnecessary to decide whether a 
foreign culture is subsumed within the term “national origin” under the Sentencing Guidelines and 
under what circumstances cultural differences might justify a downward departure. Id. Dissenting, 
Judge Becker would have vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 960 
(Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker reasoned that although cultural differences are sometimes linked 
to national origin, the two are not the same, and the district court has not only the discretion, but also 
the initial function of breaking down a claim for a departure of the sentence based on cultural 
differences. Id. at 958. In the Yu case, Judge Becker viewed as disputed the question of whether Yu 
knew or should have known that the United States does not tolerate taxpayers bribing tax collectors. 
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The manner in which culture was raised and addressed in Yu is of some 
interest here because the case provides an opportunity to see how these 
matters can appear in the U.S.-Korea negotiations setting. In Yu, the 
defendant explicitly raised the cultural differences between his native Korea 
and the United States and relied on them in an effort to gain mitigation.
286
 
The majority of the court concluded that it was unnecessary to examine the 
cultural dimension in the case.
287
 In the U.S.-Korea discussions over the 
piracy situation, cultural explanations may be raised explicitly, implicitly, or 
not at all. If they are raised clearly, it would be unwise and ludicrous for a 
U.S. representative to discount cultural explanations for certain activities, as 
the court did in Yu. Assuming the culture issue is raised then, there may be 
questions from the U.S. side regarding the details and validity of the cultural 
explanation advanced.
288
 Whereas in a criminal or civil action before an 
 
 
Id. at 959. 
 286. This was not a situation where culture was hidden or where another party was oblivious to it. 
 287. Although the result in the Yu decision is altogether defensible, some of the court’s 
expressions, not improper in an opinion supporting the sentencing of an American citizen for violation 
of a criminal law, would surely be questionable and even inappropriate in the international negotiation 
setting. Most notable is the ethnocentrically-tinged statement: “The bottom line is that, while 
immigrants lawfully entering the United States are welcome to bring their cultures with them, the 
aspect of a culture which justifies the bribing of federal agents must be left abroad.” 954 F.2d at 955. 
At the sentencing stage, the question is not whether a defendant should not have been influenced by 
his former environment, but whether that environment could be considered as a factor in mitigation of 
the sentence. 
 288. Put another way, “How do we know that’s true? Do we just take their word for it?” Pat 
Chew, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Conflict, Panel Discussion, ABA Section of Dispute 
Resolution: Cross-Cultural Disputing: International and Diversity Issues, Apr. 28, 2001, Arlington, Va. 
The assertion of Korean culture by a Korean representative poses a different situation than the 
attribution of Korean culture by a non-Korean. Regarding the latter, of interest is Jinro America Inc. v. 
Secure Investments, Inc. 266 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2001), which addresses the proper qualification of an 
expert on Korean culture, at least for purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (“Testimony by 
Experts”). In Jinro America, the purported expert witness testified on the great prevalence of 
corruption and fraud in Korean business. 266 F.3d at 1003. For instance, the witness testified that he 
would not recommend his non-Korean clients to rely on oral contracts with Korean companies: 
“[B]ecause of the culture, dealing with Korean businessmen can end up with some pretty sorry results 
. . . .” Id. (emphasis omitted). The basis of such testimony was the witness’s “personal investigative 
experiences, his ‘hobby’ of studying Korean business practices, unspecified input from his office staff 
[of a commercial security company in Korea] and his marriage to a Korean woman”; the witness had 
provided no “empirical evidence or studies” to support his testimony. Id. at 1006. The majority of the 
court held that the witness lacked the adequate foundation for the expert testimony he gave, and 
determined that it should not have been admitted under Rule 702. Id. at 1005-06. In this discussion, the 
majority observed that the witness “was not a trained sociologist or anthropologist, academic 
disciplines that might qualify one to provide reliable information about the cultural traits and behavior 
patterns of a particular group of people of a given ethnicity or nationality.” Id. at 1006. Such a 
statement appears to set a high standard for the qualifications of cultural expert witnesses. In a 
concurring opinion, Judge Wallace wrote that the purported expert testimony should not have been 
permitted because it was not relevant, and was highly critical of the “majority’s visitation to issues 
unnecessary for our disposition of this appeal.” Id. at 1010 (Wallace, J., concurring). Judge Wallace 
also observed that the majority was incorrect in its conclusion that the witness was unqualified. Id. at 
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American court, the task of proving the relevance of cultural differences is 
left to the parties and to the adversarial process, in an international 
negotiation the negotiator has the initial responsibility of being properly 
educated on the counterpart’s culture. The reality is that culture is involved in 
any “political, economic or legal” issue set in the international arena.289 
Regardless of the subject of the negotiations, “[c]ulture as an explanation is 
neither all (the prime mover) nor nothing (a mere epiphenomenon).”290 With 
respect to copyright policies of Korea and the United States, if the two could 
be said to possess cultural differences (they do),
291
 then such differences 
might produce different perspectives and approaches on the same subject 
matter. Thus, culture and its elements must be considered, discussed, and (as 
suggested above) sometimes questioned in any effort toward resolution of 
disputes over intellectual property rights. 
This is not to suggest that awareness of the American and Korean cultural 




 289. Robert J. Smith, Culture As Explanation: Neither All nor Nothing, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
425, 425 (1989). 
 290. Id. at 426. 
 291. Apart from the cultural forces that affect a party’s position on a substantive subject, there is 
the matter of the extent to which cultural differences shape negotiation style and approach to dispute 
resolution generally. Such differences could explain, in part, the “intensive” and “difficult” 
negotiations that led to the 1986 agreement between Korean and U.S. representatives. Song & Kim, 
supra note 101, at 122; Kim, supra note 12, at 2. The subject of cross-cultural negotiations is multi-
faceted and interdisciplinary, combining not only dispute resolution and negotiation methods covered 
in law schools, but also concepts seen in other disciplines—anthropology, psychology, international 
business, and politics, to name a few. Nevertheless, the legal academy has taken interest. See ROGER 
FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 166-68 (2d ed. 
1991); RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 270-91 (forthcoming 2002); 
Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 
33 (2001); Oscar G. Chase, Culture and Disputing, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 81 (1999); Oscar G. 
Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1997). At present, 
two U.S. law schools offer an independent course in “Cross-cultural Negotiations” during the 
academic year, Pepperdine (since 1989) and Missouri (2000). Telephone interview with Peter 
Robinson, Associate Director of the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution and Assistant Professor of 
Law (Jan. 16, 2002), Pepperdine University School of Law. The author has taught the course at 
Missouri. Professor Grant Ackerman developed this course. A few other schools include the course as 
part of international summer programs. New York University offers “Culture and Disputing,” taught 
by Professor Chase. (A syllabus is on file with author, and available at http://www.law.nyu. 
edu/chaseo/fall01/culturedisputing/syllabus.html.) In other schools, the subject of cross-cultural 
negotiations is a component of a broader course on international law or alternative dispute resolution. 
See, e.g., The University of Wisconsin Law School, Courses, Schedules and Exams, Course 
Descriptions: 872—Legal Issues Involving North American and East Asia, at http://courses.law.wisc. 
edu/descriptions/desc.asp?form=num&update=&param=872&Submit=Go%21&term=1022 (“[T]hree 
sessions devoted to cross-cultural negotiations . . . will introduce negotiation theory and techniques 
and issues presented in cross-cultural negotiations.”); Course Syllabus-Winter 2001, Advanced 
Mediation 696R-21, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School, at http://www.law2. 
byu. edu/Pullins/Advanced_Mediation/syllabus.html (session on “culture and gender influences”). 
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to resolve disputes definitively between the two.
292
 Mastery of what could be 
described as culture is only part of the solution. Negotiations between 
national societies are generally complex; the nature of the U.S.-Korean 
relationship, especially with regard to intellectual property issues, offers 
additional complexities. Some of these are highlighted here, beginning with 
each side’s possible reactions to the other’s positions in negotiations. 
2. U.S. Reaction.  
For the U.S. side, there is the potential for initial skepticism of the cultural 
explanation and justification. Even accepting the cultural explanations as 
valid, there is room for discussion on the extent to which any of the various 
cultural traits are applicable to the contemporary piracy situation. The culture 
“defense” is less convincing when its elements are separated and analyzed. 
As suggested above, U.S. negotiators may legitimately question whether 
Confucian traditions are the primary mover in the explanation of 
unauthorized copying and exploitation or whether there are other forces at 
work. Moreover, there is the risk that continued reliance on cultural 
explanations (especially global references to centuries of traditional 
Confucianism) to explain the rampant piracy in the contemporary setting 
could bring on, for the United States, a sense of culture fatigue.
293
  
Whatever the role of culture to explain the traditionally weak (but much 
improved) sense of copyright in Korea, the more practically urgent matter for 
American interests relates to the aggressive enforcement of the revisions in 
the textual law and the necessary cooperation from law enforcement, the 
prosecutor’s office, and the courts. Despite the increase in the number of 
criminal raids, prosecutions, and jail sentences in the past few years, U.S. 





 The International Intellectual Property Alliance, a private 
 
 
 292. For private U.S. representatives and copyright owners, knowledge of the culturally-
dependent Korean copyright system provides an explanation for the cultural regard for the integrity of 
the author’s work, the traditional preference for conciliation over litigation, and the use of the apology 
in settlement. But this information aids little in the curing of piracy of their products. 
 293. The reliance on culture to explain copying might seem too convenient to the U.S. side. For 
example Koreans explain that the copying of a book honors the author, and rely on the revered status 
that the scholar-author enjoyed in the Confucian hierarchy. But this cultural trait does not explain the 
copying of the works of entertainers, who historically occupied the lowest and most degraded status. 
Yet a different traditional practice, namely, that entertainers were on “retainer” to the noble classes and 
did not produce works for themselves, is used to explain why the copying of their work is justified. See 
supra text accompanying notes 143-46. 
 294. See IIPA, 2001 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 10, at 214. 
 295. Id. at 218. “Jail terms are routinely suspended, and no effort is made to supervise the 
activities of convicted defendants”; thus, sentencing has little deterrent effect. Id. Korean 
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organization that represents U.S. copyright-based industries in improving 
international copyright protection,
296
 cites “disturbing evidence of bias 
against foreign copyright owners.”297 Moreover, over the years, American 
counsel have questioned whether the Korean judiciary is partial to Korean 
interests.
298
 Thus, U.S. observers suggest a fundamental revamping of the 
Korean criminal justice and enforcement system.
299
 On this point, there is 
agreement, by two Korean commentators, who note that a system that can 
provide effective remedies for infringement of intellectual property rights 
“will require a review of the judicial system in Korea as a whole, including 
the court structure, legal education system, the process of selecting judges, 
and judicial administration to mention a few.”300  
3. Korean Reaction  
Both Korean and American observers generally agree that pressure from 
the United States caused the new, comprehensive Korean copyright policy 
beginning in 1986.
301
 This perception explains the prevalent attitude in 
 
 
commentators acknowledge that some of the raids and prosecutions were more for appearances than 
substance, that is, to avoid making the U.S. Watch List or Priority Watch List, rather than toward 
genuine implementation of rights-based copyright system. See Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 134. 
 296. See International Intellectual Property Alliance, About IIPA, at http://www.iipa.com/ 
aboutiipa.html. 
 297. IIPA, 2001 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 10, at 211. 
 298. See Enger, supra note 100, at 206-07. Note the phrasing on the Internet site of the Supreme 
Court of Korea, which could magnify the partisan image: “With speedy and impartial trials, the 
Supreme [C]ourt of Korea will continue to fulfill [its] constitutional mission to serve the Korean 
people and to protect their basic human rights.” Supreme Court of Korea, Home, at http://www. 
scourt.go.kr/english/ (emphases added). American attorneys would likely find troubling some 
traditional practices in the Korean judiciary discussed candidly in Kim, supra note 272, at 48-52 
(stating “cordial personal relationships, not convincing arguments or technical legal skills, play a 
major role in legal practice” and reporting judicial cronyism and unethical practices by judges). Chief 
among them is jun kwan ye wu, which  
consists of affording preferential treatment during litigation to recently retired judges. This 
preferential treatment has been [made] possible by the unusual guild mentality, which was 
produced by the unified training and the homogeneous composition of the legal profession. The 
practice operates as follows: a recently retired judge who files suit as a private attorney receives 
favorable treatment from the court during the legal process. In a survey conducted by a Korean 
newspaper, 45 out of 100 practicing attorneys admitted that they have experienced such 
preferential treatment. Incumbent judges are expected by custom to help former colleagues in this 
way.  
Id. at 51 (footnotes omitted). 
 299. See IIPA, 2001 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 10, at 213, 214. 
 300. Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 134. Such changes seem drastic and unnecessary to those 
who believe much progress has been made in the development of copyright protection in Korea. See, 
e.g., Jong, supra note 107, at 43. 
 301. See SANG JO JONG, JI-JUHK-JEH-SAHN-KWON [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] 10 (1997); Enger, 
supra note 100, at 199; Gadbaw, supra note 26, at 276, 299; Lee, supra note 200, at 196-97; Min & 
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Korean society—“including police, prosecutors, and sometimes courts”—
that provisions of the current copyright law were “enacted to meet the 
demands of foreigners,”302 that is, the United States.303 The resentment 
against American imposition is likely to be more pointed with publicly 
visible efforts in enforcement, such as raids, prosecutions, and penalties 
against Korean parties. Moreover, Korean representatives may see the 
American-mandated legislation and increased enforcement activities 
beginning in the 1980s as part of a continuing pattern of the United States 
imposing its intellectual property preferences on Korean soil. The United 
States had previously sought and obtained formal legal protections of 
American intellectual property rights on the Korean peninsula in the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Korea, as a protectorate of Japan, was 
subject to a 1908 treaty between the United States and Japan, in which Japan 
agreed to extend to American copyright holders in Korea the same copyright 
protections that existed in Japan.
304
 Thus, the first legal copyright protections 
in Korea
305
 were a matter of U.S., not Korean, initiative, and the same 
characterization could be made about the reforms beginning in the 1980s. 
One Korean commentator characterizes the American influence and surveys 
the situation thus: 
[The 1908 U.S.-Japan treaty] . . . was made upon demand of the 
United States which wanted to protect its citizens’ intellectual 
 
 
Sullivan, supra note 200, at 50; Song, Legal Remedies, supra note 93, at 3; Youm, supra note 91, at 
298. One commentator preferred a less pointed characterization of the U.S. involvement: “Partly with 
encouragements from industrialized nations including the U.S. and, also, partly as part of the process 
of internationalization of domestic industry, Korea has made dramatic reforms in the field of copyright 
law . . . .” Jong, supra note 107, at 43 (emphasis added). See also PARK, supra note 94, at 299 (new 
legislation result of part “external pressure” and part Korean realization of wide gap between “social 
reality” and intellectual property legal system). 
 302. Song & Kim, supra note 101, at 121. 
 303. For many Koreans, mention of “foreign” or “international” is often understood to mean 
American. See Robert A. Scalapino, The United States and Asia in 1998: Summitry Amid Crisis, 
ASIAN SURVEY, Jan. 1, 1999, available at 1999 WL 19055685. 
 304. Convention Between the United States and Japan for Protection of Patents, etc., May, 19, 
1908, 35 Stat. 2041 art. I. Koreans would receive the same protection as Japanese and American 
citizens. Id. Interestingly, the treaty provided that “Korean subjects [would] enjoy in the United States 
the same [copyright] protection as native citizens,” but only “upon fulfillment of the formalities 
prescribed by the laws and regulations of the United States.” Id. art. IV. Such formalities are not 
further elaborated in the treaty. In any event, the 1908 treaty was “considered as having been 
abrogated . . . since it was included in the notification which was given on behalf of the United States 
Government to the Japanese Government on April 22, 1953, indicating the pre-war bilateral treaties or 
conventions which the United States wished to continue in force or revive.” TREATIES IN FORCE, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 473, 483 n.19 (app.). 
 305. Two authors have indicated that Korea was one of the original signatories to the Berne 
Convention, see Min & West, supra note 13, at 562, a contention that is specifically refuted by 
another, Youm, supra note 91, at 280. 
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properties in Korea, soon after Japan, as victor of both the China-
Japan War and the Russia-Japan War, began ruling the Korean 
Peninsula. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [The 1986 revision of the copyright law] was made under 
strong pressure of the United States for the sake of accomplishing 
trade balance between the United States and Korea. It reminds us of 
the situation eighty years ago when the first document on copyright 
protection in Korea was born upon demand of the United States.
306
  
Compounding the situation is the problem of the general anti-American 
sentiment in Korea.
307
 Anti-Americanism could also be considered a part of 
the contemporary Korean culture, to the extent that it shapes the Korean 
mindset and affects Korea’s interactions with American interests. A society 
with a long, shared history and little external influence is likely to resent 
 
 
 306. Song, Legal Remedies, supra note 93, at 2-3. 
 307. Once a nation that was strongly pro-American, Korea changed beginning in the 1980s, with 
Koreans questioning the alleged U.S. support of the oppressive regime of President Doo Hwan Chun, 
and growing tension over trade issues. See generally MARK L. CLIFFORD, TROUBLED TIGER: 
BUSINESSMEN, BUREAUCRATS, AND GENERALS IN SOUTH KOREA 297-305 (1994); SOUTH KOREA: A 
COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 130, at 241; Jinwung Kim, The Nature of South Korean Anti-
Americanism, 34 KOREA J. 36 (1994); Jinwung Kim, Recent Anti-Americanism in South Korea, 29 
ASIAN SURVEY 749 (1989); Gi-Wook Shin, South Korean Anti-Americanism, 36 ASIAN SURVEY 787 
(1996). 
 Over the years, there have been periodic reports in the popular media of rising anti-American 
sentiments. See, e.g., Steve Glain, Blame the Yankees? Fallout from Korean Trials Worries U.S. 
Policy Makers, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1995, at 1; Ju-Yeon Kim, Uncle Sam Effigy Skewered in 
Anti-Government Rally, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 28, 1994, available at 1994 WL 10135257; Frank 
Langfitt, Anti-Americanism Returning in Korea 50 years After War: US Troop Presence Produces 
Frictions, BALT. SUN, June 24, 2000, at 1A; William McGurn, Anti-Americanism Heads South of the 
Korean Divide, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1988, at A21; Jonathan Power, Editorial, Bush’s Suspicious 
Gambit with North Korea, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 25, 2001, at E1; Kevin Sullivan & Mary 
Jordan, S. Korea Wants to Be Grown-up Ally, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1995, at A31; Radicals Attack 
U.S. Military Installation in Seoul, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 25, 1991, available at 1991 WL 
6183153; S. Koreans Urged To Curb Anti-American Sentiment, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10, 1989, at 4, 
available at 1989 WL 4631079; U.S. Travel Advisory “Overreaction,” Says Rep. Chung Mong-Joon, 
KOREA HERALD, Aug. 12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 21234287; Washington and Seoul Switch to 
Snarling, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 28, 1996, at 70, available at 1996 WL 10771259; Will Anti-
Americanism Resurface, KOREA TIMES, Nov. 20, 1998, available at 1998 WL 21404993. Anti-
American sentiments may even contribute to the negative image that some Koreans in Korea have of 
Koreans stateside. See SAMSUNG PRESS FOUNDATION, A STUDY OF KOREAN AND AMERICAN 
NEWSPAPER EDITORS’ PERCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES, KOREA, AND NORTH KOREA 19 (1998), 
discussed in Jeh-mi-dong-po Image Boo-jung-juhk [Negative Image of Korean Americans], HAN-KUK 
ILBO [THE KOREA TIMES] (Chicago edition), June 26, 1999, § 2, at 1 (reporting survey that showed 
44.4% of respondents had negative image of Koreans in America, 30% positive image, and 25.6% 
neutral image). See also Ilhyung Lee, Race Consciousness and Minority Scholars, 33 CONN. L. REV. 
535, 571 n.263 (2001) (recounting Korean author’s experience in Korea). 
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military, economic, or legal intruders and to resist cooperation in carrying out 
transplanted legal rules designed to protect such intruders. A vivid example 
of Korean resentment was seen shortly before the enactment of the 1986 
copyright legislation, when Korean publishers “staged an ‘Anti-U.S. 
Pressure’ rally in which headbands were worn to protest U.S. efforts at 
intellectual property reform.”308 This dissension is part of the copyright 
culture in Korea. 
The story of Hangul & Computer Company,
309
 a Korean software 
company, highlights both the extent of piracy in Korea and the nationalistic, 
anti-American mood there.
310
 The company produces word processing 
software for Hangul, the native Korean alphabet, and eventually captured 
eighty percent of the market. Illegal copying of the software product was 
widespread, which led to obvious revenue loss and put the company on the 
verge of bankruptcy. In debt by $19 million, Hangul & Computer announced 
plans to enter into an agreement with Microsoft in which the American 
company would invest $20 million in exchange for the Korean company 
withdrawing its Hangul software from the Korean market, allowing 
Microsoft to pursue more of it.
311
 Public outrage and “a nationalist backlash” 
followed.
312
 Koreans saw Hangul as “the people’s software,”313 a national 
cultural treasure,
314
 and viewed Microsoft’s financial arrangement as “an 
intrusion into the national psyche.”315 In the end, a national campaign to 
“save hangul” raised capital from the public and Hangul & Computer called 





 308. Gadbaw, supra note 26, at 280. 
 309. The company was subsequently renamed Haansoft. See Laxmi Nakarmi, Pulling Back from 
the Brink: Korea’s Software Giant Gets Internet-Ready Fast, ASIAWEEK, May 26, 2000, available at 
2000 WL 8936908. 
 310. A thorough press account is available in Sims, supra note 22. See also Michael Baker, Korea 
Asks Gates: Whose Tongue Is It?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 2, 1998, at 6, available at LEXIS, 
News File; John Burton, Microsoft Loses Deal in S. Korea, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), July 21, 1998, at 
27, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; Jim Erickson, Saving the People’s Software: 
South Koreans Block a Microsoft Power Play, ASIAWEEK, Aug. 7, 1998, at 46, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News File; Don Kirk, Koreans Bristle at Software Deal: 
Local Company Draws Fire for Ceding a Market to Microsoft, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 3, 1998, at 
17, available at 1998 WL 4792789. 
 311. This agreement would have allowed Microsoft to gain a greater share of the market in Korea, 
perhaps the only country in which it did not have a monopoly in the word processing sector. See Sims, 
supra note 22, at 1. 
 312. Burton, supra note 310, at 27. Hangul & Computer’s president was characterized as a traitor. 
See Baker, supra note 310, at 6. 
 313. Erickson, supra note 309, at 46 (quoting president of Korea Venture Capital Companies 
Association). 
 314. Id. 
 315. Baker, supra note 310, at 6 (quoting Korean Fair Trade Commission official). 
 316. Burton, supra note 310, at 27; Korean Language National Software Program Faces the Axe, 
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The Hangul & Computer matter vividly illustrates the extent of the piracy 
problem in Korea. Out of the approximately three million copies of the 
Hangul software in use, two and a half million were illegally duplicated.
317
 
Thus, Korean products were subject to the same rampant piracy about which 
the United States has complained. The irony was that while domestic piracy 
contributed to the company’s financial woes, Korean sources expressed little 
interest in a financial bailout.
318
 But when American Microsoft emerged, 
Koreans quickly portrayed it as a predatory, imperialistic colonizer
319—a 
characterization normally reserved for Korea’s long-time nemesis, Japan. As 
a result of the Hangul & Computer experience, the government announced a 
crackdown on piracy of software.
320
 This reaction supports the view that a 
nation does not press for copyright protection seriously until it recognizes the 
need to protect the work of its authors. Yet piracy of software and other 
goods has continued, and Korea has returned to the U.S. “Priority Watch 
List.”321 The Hangul & Computer episode was not so much a matter of 
Korean society realizing at long last the need for copyright protection of its 
intellectual property. Rather, the event poignantly demonstrated the Korean 
revulsion to the notion of a foreign (American) entity having ownership of 
that most Korean property.
322
  
4. U.S.-Korea Intellectual Property History  
The historical development of international copyright protection in the 
United States and Korea is also pertinent to the U.S.-Korea discussions over 
copyright protections. Cultural differences would explain why this history is 
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more of a concern for Korea. Scholars note that “different cultures may be 
more or less attracted to past, present or future orientations.”323 Korea, with 
its rich Confucian tradition, appears to be a society that is oriented to the past, 
one that “values tradition and continuity with the past,”324 and is still 
connected to “a nostalgic past to which everything attempted in the present 
must appeal.”325 In contrast, the United States is oriented more to the present 
and future.
326
 If this cultural difference is maintained in negotiations, then it 
could explain why American negotiators are more likely to focus on the 
protection of copyright rights prospectively and why Korean negotiators may 
assess current practices in reference to the past. With regard to the latter, 
Korean representatives could not be faulted for raising the comparative 
development of international copyright protection seen in both countries’ 
histories. 
An obvious parallel is that neither country’s initial copyright law provided 
protection for the works of foreign authors.
327
 The U.S. Copyright Act of 
1790 was more explicit, specifically excluding works “by any person not a 
citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction 
of the United States.”328 For several decades, the United States played the 
role of “copyright outlaws.”329 There was little change in the protection of 
foreign authors until a full century after the initial copyright law,
330
 but even 
then the protection of foreign authors “proved to be to some extent 
illusory.”331 The United States did not become a respectable member of the 
international copyright community until the middle of the twentieth century, 
and only after it realized its status as a copyright exporting nation.
332
 In 1968, 
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the Assistant Register of Copyrights of the United States Copyright Office 
acknowledged that “[u]ntil the Second World War the United States had little 
reason to take pride in its international copyright relations; in fact, it had a 
great deal to be ashamed of. With few exceptions its role in international 
copyright was marked by intellectual shortsightedness, political isolationism, 
and narrow economic self-interest.”333 In short, the United States had “a 
pretty embarrassing history”334 in the international copyright community. 
This history will not likely be lost on the Korean side. For Korea, the 
concept of copyright was absent during the five centuries of the Yi dynasty; 
and after liberation from Japan at the close of World War II and another war 
on the peninsula, intellectual property rights protection was not a top priority. 
Even with the piracy of foreign works continuing, progress in the 
development of copyright protections in Korea was quite rapid, 
comparatively speaking. Korea’s Ambassador to the United States made this 
point in 1986: “Korea . . . has agreed to protect intellectual property at a far 
earlier stage of industrialization than either the United States or Japan.”335  
B. Incorporating Culture in Negotiations 
Helpful in the U.S.-Korea setting is that the culture of both societies is 
amenable to the prospect of conciliation toward resolution. Alternative 
dispute resolution has gained increasing acceptance in the American legal 
arena.
336
 Although Korean society has become more litigious in recent years, 
Korean leadership is still likely to prefer resolution of disputes through 
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 in matters of international dispute. Direct negotiation between 
the United States and Korea present the best means to resolve the piracy 
situation because it allows for discussion and consideration of all factors, 
including those of a cultural dimension. In the deliberations toward 
negotiations then, negotiators should be aware of the American and Korean 
cultural contexts that shape each jurisdiction’s copyright policy.  
Initially, when the United States complains of rampant piracy in Korea of 
its copyrighted works, resulting in a trade imbalance and losses for private 
authors and companies, Korea must be mindful of not only the U.S. 
economic interests, but also the deeply rooted regard for the sacred right of 
property that fuels the American objection.
338
 Conversely, the U.S. side must 
be aware that its trading partner is a society with five centuries of Confucian 
traditions. Some of these traditions, which still have a residual presence 
today, help to explain certain aspects of the piracy situation. Yet mere 
awareness of the other’s specific cultural traits will not solve the piracy 
problem. This Article offers preliminary suggestions on appreciating the role 
of culture in future negotiations. These suggestions must be viewed as a 
beginning, rather than an end, of the contemplation and deliberation of 
cultural factors relevant to copyright policy and the piracy situation.
339
  
Cultural education and information will enable each party to characterize 
its objections and interests in terms that the other can better accept. For 
instance, U.S. representatives might draw comparisons between the 
American regard for property rights in copyright and the Korean respect for 
the author’s moral right of integrity under Korean law. Thus, if the deeply 
revered ownership of private property is held in the same reverence as the 
equally regarded personal interest in preserving the integrity of the author’s 
work, Korean negotiators might better accept that unauthorized copying of 
the author’s work is equivalent in impact to dishonoring the author through 
unauthorized alteration of the work. Also, assuming Korean society is a 
collectivist culture that tends to “emphasize resource sharing rather than 
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individual ownership,”340 American representatives could characterize the 
licensing relationship between authors and Korean companies as a vehicle to 
facilitate the sharing of property interests. 
Clearly, the Korean side has the more difficult task in negotiations 
because Americans are unlikely to accept any explanation suggesting 
justifications for piracy of American products.
341
 Still, the parties may reach 
mutual understanding of conflicting positions by building on common 
foundations. For example, Korean negotiators could explain that although 
Korean society, like U.S. society, appreciates a desire for economic wealth 
(though for different ends), the technicalities of property ownership and 
divisible property rights are still in development. Moreover, if the American 
example is any indication,
342
 a meaningful system of international copyright 
protection in Korea will require patience,
343
 a change in status from copyright 
importer to exporter, or both. 
CONCLUSION 
Commentators often point to cultural differences to explain the rampant 
piracy of American intellectual property products in Korea, which allegedly 
results in millions of dollars of losses for U.S. companies and a trade 
imbalance. This Article examines the cultural dimension to copyright in the 
United States and Korea. It attempts to determine the extent to which each 
nation’s copyright system (its laws, enforcement, and underlying purpose) is 
based on the respective society’s culture. To understand the two countries’ 
cultures, one must consider not only the origins of Korean and American 
traditional attitudes—from the Yi dynasty when Confucian traditions ruled 
and from the days of colonial America—but also attributes of more 
contemporary Korean and American cultures. In summary, the American 
approach to copyright (and intellectual property in general) appears to be 
based on the time-honored societal desire for property and the expectation of 
property rights protection. Korean culture is more complex. For centuries, the 
Confucian society had little need for, or appreciation of, copyright. In the 
twentieth century, Korea emerged as a player in the international marketplace 
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and technological age; it continues its transformation today. Although 
Confucian attitudes still explain aspects of the Korean approach to copyright, 
economic interest has emerged as the key motivator in the piracy situation. 
Still, culture will continue to play a role in U.S.-Korea discussions over this 
difficult matter. Each side will need to be aware of the other’s culturally-
based approach to copyright—especially the patterned thinking based on 
certain societal values. Awareness of the societal attitudes and the different 
realities they create will facilitate a more informed dialogue between the two 
nations. Otherwise, there will remain the risk of attributions of lawless and 
uncivilized misappropriation by one side and imperialistic monopolization by 
the other. 
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